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PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine how expected sale time of housing in Finland is formed and which 
factors have an effect on it.  I use marketing time of dwellings as a proxy of expected sale time. This is a 
descriptive study in nature, because no earlier papers with Finnish data exist to compare the results with. The 
analysis covers housing features as well as its location. In addition, I study macro-economy and date of market 
entry related variables’ effects on expected sale time. For most individuals, housing transactions are largest 
investment decisions of their lives and I aim to explain the high variation in the sale times within the Finnish 
housing market and in comparison with other asset classes. 
 
DATA 
 
I study my research questions mainly based on housing advertisements from January 2004 to July 2012. The 
advertisement data was collected from three sources: Etuovi, Oikotie and Kiinteistömaailma. In addition, I 
collected real transaction data from asuntojen.hintatiedot.fi and various background data from Statistics Finland.  
  
RESULTS 
 
The results show that nearly all available housing and listing date related features have a statistically significant 
relationship with expected sale time. I also find that submarkets within certain cities do not vary much from the 
city consensus and more variation is present at times with poor state of economy. Results suggest that a seller 
with no rush to sell should wait for the optimal listing time to ensure her dwelling to raise interest in the market.  
I find that buyers’ search criteria selection has a clear link to expected sale time as well. With a careful selection 
of listing price the seller may lower her dwelling’s expected sale time.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
For most people, housing transactions are the most significant investment decisions of their 
lives. Unprepared individuals may get surprised about the transaction time the process takes. 
Other people are aware of this and take the longer transaction time as granted. In this thesis I 
seek patterns and study market characteristics to minimize the information asymmetries 
surrounding the time it takes to trade a certain dwelling. My main objective is not to find how 
to truncate the transaction time, but I seek to explain why house A will be sold earlier than 
house B or the other way around. Most of financial asset research relates to securities market, 
which is considered more appealing and where data is easier to collect, but popularity of real 
estate research has seemingly increased in past decades. I will study one of the housing 
markets’ important separating characteristics –liquidity.  
In housing, liquidity can be considered as sale time and transaction costs. When selling few 
liquid stocks in a stock exchange at market price, one can be rather sure to get them sold 
instantly and with a relative small cost. However, housing markets seem to be less liquid as 
explained later. A housing transaction, even at a market price, can take a long time before 
completion. Online market places have reduced the search time remarkably (see e.g. Bakos 
1997), but housing features, such as heterogeneity, still reduce the probability of a quick 
transaction. In addition to time consumption of the trade, the physical costs of selling a house 
may get remarkable high. In a typical setting, buyers search for houses with desired attributes 
in the market and sellers receive offers from them. This process requires time and I’m 
interested whether I can find systematic differences in marketing time with different housing 
or market features.   
My focus is on dwellings of all kind in Finland excluding other type of real estate as business 
facilities and summer cottages. I have personal interest towards real estate as an investment 
vehicle and consider myself a future real estate investor. In addition, I want to contribute to 
existing literature with a Finnish perspective and thus do my part in improving the grounding 
for future research. 
I follow the logic of known real estate liquidity studies (see e.g. Anglin et al. (2003) or Pryce 
and Gibb (2006)) and combine other approved methods such as behavioral studies on top of 
them to have a diverse research. Finnish studies on real estate are mainly about consumer 
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preferences (see e.g. Juntto, 2007 or Tyvimaa and Kananen 2011), pricing (see e.g. Oikarinen, 
2007) or structural development (see e.g. Huovari et al. 2002 and 2006). What makes this 
study even more unique is that most of papers published in Finland are done by research 
institutions such as Statistics Finland, Pellervo Economic Research Institute or KTI 
Kiinteistötieto Oy. A great challenge with this topic is the lack of popularity among 
academics leading to low number of recognized theories. In addition, most of newer papers 
disprove methods used in older papers narrowing the possible testable theories even further. 
To my best knowledge there is no other paper studying marketing times with Finnish data 
available. This motivates me to study the Finnish housing markets to search for personalities 
and consistent patterns for expected sale time estimation. 
Dwellings people live in make up more than the half of the Finns’ gross wealth. If I add 
investment property and recreational dwellings to it, I get a total contribution of 76 percent for 
real estate in 2009, as shown by Figure 1. This is why my study should be interesting and 
helpful for many people outside academics as well.  
Figure 1 Distribution of Finnish households’ gross assets  
This column chart shows how the gross wealth of an average Finnish household’s was distributed in the end of 
last three decades as percentages of total gross assets. Year 1988 did not include separate data of investment 
property and it wasn’t necessarily zero. Data is from the Statistics Finland. 
 
If I take the investor’s point of view, understanding features of different assets is a benefit 
when constructing one’s own investment portfolio. Real estate can be used as part of portfolio 
whereas other assets. Motivations to hold real estate include risk decreasing and positive cash 
flow securing in terms of rents as discussed later in this paper. Friedman (1971) continued the 
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work of Markowitz (1952) to apply real estate in modern portfolio theory. He wrote that real 
estate works just as stocks when constructing a portfolio. Friedman states that real estate can 
provide higher risk adjusted returns as stocks when the target’s risk and return are known for 
calculating this. In addition, real estate returns have a positive correlation with inflation 
allowing real estate investments to serve as an inflation protection (see e.g. Firstenberg et al. 
(1988)).  
Despite the important investor point of view discussed above, one must remember that real 
estate, especially housing, is often not acquired for investment purposes, but for example as a 
place to live in. This could be one factor causing housing markets to be less liquid than those 
of public stocks. Public stocks can have strategic owners as well (as the state in Finland), but 
usually their free float is large enough to enable more liquid markets than with housing.   
1.2 MARKETING TIME DEFINITION AND POTENTIAL LIMITATIONS 
In this paper I study marketing time of houses. In this chapter I explain what I mean with 
marketing time and the differences to similar measures. One commonly discussed measure is 
the sale time of houses. The difference between these two concepts is that whereas sale time 
is the time between the listing of a house by the seller until the money is transferred by the 
buyer (Belkin et al. 1976), marketing time does not necessarily confirm a sale, only that the 
marketing of the property has ended. This means that with high probability there are 
observations that have never lead to a transaction. These are called censored observations as I 
later discuss. Realtors and market places only know the time they have advertised the house, 
thus the marketing time. The main data used in this study bases on marketing time and 
therefore uncertainty of transactions exists. Most papers on transaction time use term Time-
On-Market (TOM) regardless of their data type (sale time or marketing time) thus making me 
feel comfortable using an own definition of TOM as well. The reason for the vague use of this 
term is that the whole selling time is not recorded by any actor. Only the seller might know 
the actual time when she starts the selling process and when the transaction occurs. Therefore, 
even if I had the transaction dates available for all observations, it would still be a proxy of 
the sale time. 
One thing to consider is that individual sellers may have tried to sell the house by themselves 
before contacting a realtor. Also, the seller may have changed the realtor during the selling 
process or delisted her target for a period during the selling process. The latter actions may 
increase interest in the house as discussed later on. These phenomena will cause outliers in the 
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data that I’m unable to fully distinguish. I believe marketing times I use will serve a good 
proxy and quality of results will not suffer from this method.  
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This paper is first of its kind in Finland, which makes me eager to have multiple research 
questions allowing me to study the subject widely while covering multiple issues. The key 
research questions are:  
1. How does marketing time of a dwelling depend on housing features, location and local 
macro-economic factors? 
2. Do submarkets exist and how they affect the marketing time in various Finnish 
housing markets? 
3. Are there behavioral patterns decreasing or altering liquidity on the Finnish housing 
market?  
1.4 CONTRIBUTION TO EXISTING LITERATURE 
I will use tests performed in other countries to serve insight to Finnish housing markets. No 
one has done exactly the same kind of study and I hope my results will be interesting to read 
and that they help the reader to identify the Finnish housing market or differentiate them from 
others. In addition, I test for behavioral patterns mainly studied with asset returns to see if 
they are applicable for marketing time as well.  
My results suggest that most housing, location and market entry date related variables have 
significant impact on expected sale time. I also find that submarkets within certain cities do 
not vary much from the city consensus and more variation is present at times with poor state 
of economy. In addition, a seller with no rush to sell should wait for the optimal listing time to 
ensure her dwelling to raise interest in the market.  I find that buyers’ search criteria selection 
has a clear link to expected sale time as well. With a careful selection of listing price the seller 
may lower her dwelling’s expected sale time.  
1.5 STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
The rest of my thesis is organized as follows: First I explain groundings of the work helping 
reader to understand the business field the paper is about. Secondly I conclude theoretical 
aspects and previous literature on housing markets and other key elements of this study. Then 
I introduce the methodology and the data I use in this study. Lastly I present the results and 
summarize the thesis with conclusions and suggestions for further research.   
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2 PRACTICAL SETTING 
This part is for the reader to understand how the Finnish housing market has developed to its 
current state and the basic characteristics of the market. With housing markets, it is important 
to have a long period of time to see structural changes as they are slower than those of asset 
markets of higher liquidity.   
2.1 DEVELOPMENT AND STRUCTURE OF THE FINNISH HOUSING MARKET 
The Finnish housing market has developed a lot in past decades. This is largely due to 
deregulation of the markets and international influences. The volatility of Finnish housing 
market started when international shocks begun to affect local economy. This was in the 
1970s although the post-oil crisis drop in real prices was due to high inflation. In 1986 the 
gradual opening of capital markets with good employment situation and stable economic 
growth phase lead to quick increase in dwelling prices as people got their loans easier 
(Huovari et al. 2006). Same time the down payment ratios lowered and this led to huge 
growth of credit and a housing market boom (Oikarinen 2007). This and the later depression 
of early 1990’s were reasons for further development.  
Laws on tax deductions on mortgage and interest payments have varied in fundamentals and 
affected willingness to house purchases. What is interesting from a housing investor’s point of 
view, the rental markets were not fully opened until 1995, after a three year gradual 
development. Only since then the investors have had the freedom to decide for rents (except 
of increases in current contracts). A large portion of houses in Finland is publicly regulated 
and only those under private control face no regulation of pricing. (Oikarinen 2007) 
Figure 2 shows how the real prices of housing have developed during the past four decades. 
As discussed earlier, the financial markets were gradually opened in mid-1980 and the steep 
upward curve is the result of overheated housing markets. The following drop was partly due 
to the overheated markets, but highly affected by the general recession in Finland.  
Figure 2 also shows that Helsinki metropolitan area (HMA) prices in 1989 peaked higher than 
Finland as a whole. The same phenomenon has occurred with every time the prices have 
increased in the past 40 years. On the other hand, HMA has traditionally survived the price 
drops quicker than Finland in general and has never sunk below the country index. My data 
includes city of Helsinki and it is important to understand the heavy weight this area 
represents when analyzing Finnish data.  
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Figure 2 Real price index for old Finnish apartment buildings 
This figure illustrates real price development from Q1/1970 – Q2/2009. The base year is set at 1970 with the 
value of 100. Finland as a whole and Helsinki metropolitan area are shown on own lines. Source of data is 
Statistics Finland. 
 
We are currently again at the price levels of the previous housing market bubble and the 
discussion is lively whether another burst will occur. KTI (2012) reports that the Finnish 
housing market currently faces mild uncertainty in the short run, but whether the movement is 
up or down it will not be a large one. They remind that from investors’ point of view a 
temporary drop in housing prices is not crucial, because at this time popularity of rented 
houses tends to rise. If the investor can renegotiate rents, this can level the situation. KTI also 
points out that investments in housing should be considered as long term assets. 
Figure 3 illustrates how the number of different size households has developed in 1992-2011. 
It is fairly clear that larger households have diminished and single and double households 
have increased in popularity steadily over time. This results from demographic changes in 
Finland. Number of people living alone or two by themselves has grown with traditional 
family model diminishing in the society. When the number of average household members 
lowers, together with population growth, it increases the number of households as Figure 3 
suggests. A rational conclusion of this would be that new apartment houses would be smaller 
in average to serve smaller households. The logic here is that number of smaller households 
would rise especially in urban areas and mostly apartment buildings are constructed in them. 
However, Figure 4 doesn’t support this suggestion; average new apartment size has grown 
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from 75 to 82 square meters in 1990 to 2011. On the other hand, this information supports the 
suggestion of increased living standards in Finland.  
Figure 3 Development of household unit size in Finland 1992-2011 
This figure shows how the household composition has developed 1992-2011 in Finland. Number of persons 
indicates how many persons live in the same household, thus in the same dwelling. The data is from Statistics 
Finland. 
 
Statistics Finland report that the number of households living in apartment houses and 
detached houses has increased in the past two decades whereas row houses and similar have 
remained their popularity constant. Detached houses and similar contributed for 89 percent of 
all housing buildings in the end of 2011 in number terms. This relation is clearly explained by 
that apartment houses shelter many more households than the detached houses.  
Figure 4 shows the amount of new construction permits in Finland 1990-2011. It indicates 
that relation of permitted floor space between different housing types has remained quite the 
same except of a high season of detached houses in mid-2000. All three economy dips during 
the period, the current, the internet bubble and the early 1990’s, are clearly visible in this 
figure as lower demand for housing construction. Construction permits on all housing types 
seem to reflect to economic changes. Permits on detached houses have the highest volatility 
which can be explained by the relatively high amount of them financed in individuals. During 
an economic downturn the state may start constructions of apartment buildings as part of their 
reflationary policies and individuals are more vulnerable.  
 
 
 
500 000
1 000 000
1 500 000
2 000 000
2 500 000
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Number of households 
1 Person 2 Persons 3+ Persons All households
8 
 
 
Figure 4 Construction permits and completed housing 
This figure shows the number and area of new construction permits 1990-2011. The scale on the left-hand side 
shows amount of permitted area in square meters plotted by the lines. Columns indicate the number of permits 
shown in the scale on the right-hand side. The data source is Statistics Finland.   
 
Figure 5 Relation of construction permits and completed housing 
In this figure we see how the relation of construction permits and completed housing has developed 1990-2011. 
Primary vertical axis represents amounts and the secondary axis ratio of completed housing divided by initial 
permits. Dotted lines show the same relation, but with and without a lag in construction. Data source is Statistics 
Finland.  
 
In Figure 5 I show how the number of construction permits correlates with completed housing. 
It is clear that construction takes time and therefore completed houses lag behind permits. 
However, Figure 5 serves interesting information. Prior the internet bubble, mainly in 1999 
and 2000, the number of permits was very high, but the number of completed housing in 
following years didn’t get near the permit level. This shows that many plans were left 
unrealized as the economy turned bad. The two lines for permits and completed buildings 
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cross every time the economy turns with a small lag. Similar calculation can be done to all 
years and see how the rate of permits and completed housing fluctuates. Dotted lines show 
this contribution in Figure 5. We see that without a lag the relation fluctuates heavily, because 
construction takes time and when the economy turns bad not all building sites are closed and 
completed buildings still arise. When I analyze the same relation with a one year lag in 
number of permits, e.g. completed in 2000 divided by permits in 1999, the line shows a proxy 
of completion rate of buildings. It is clear that the number of completed buildings is lower 
than number of permits if we don’t account for illegal construction.   
2.2 CONSUMPTION PREFERENCES 
Overheating of markets in late 1980 also enhanced perhaps the most discussed development 
in Finnish housing markets of diverging of areas in terms of population also known as 
urbanization. One example of this is people from small towns going to a university or a job in 
a bigger city never to return. Another cause of leaving is the industrial cutbacks. There are 
lots of Finnish towns build around a factory or an industrial function. In a case of a shutdown 
people often need to move elsewhere for a job. Non-returners leave empty dwellings to these 
small towns thus lowering the capital value of other home owners, i.e. supply grows while 
demand lowers (Huovari et al. 2002). Social effects may rise in importance as well if for 
example fewer children are born and the local school therefore shut down.  
They continue by arguing that larger cities, especially Helsinki, face some challenges more 
powerful than other cities. Infrastructural development is hard to keep up with the increasing 
population. Increasing population also reflects the housing markets with higher rents and 
dwelling prices due to the higher demand. This effect can be explained with the four quadrant 
model I introduce in chapter 3.2. When the demand grows and new housing construction 
takes time, the rational solution is for the prices to go up as the equation of supply and 
demand says. This phenomenon can harm growing companies who have trouble getting new 
labor force in the city. Winners in this contest are the cities that offer jobs and education 
institutions. Municipalities around these growing cities have witnessed increased population 
as well. These surrounding areas are alternative living spaces for people working in a city, but 
unsatisfied with the high living costs. Development of public transportation shortens the 
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distance and allows for people to live outside of cities as well. Urbanization rate in Finland 
was at 68 percent level in 2011
1
. 
Urbanization in Finland started relatively late, in the 1950’s after the Second World War. The 
largest migrations from rural areas into cities took place in the 1960’s and 1970’s. To serve 
this inflow of people a number of cities started massive constructions of concrete suburbs. 
Most of these suburbs consisted of apartment houses that worked in form of limited 
companies (Viitanen et al. 2003). This construction peak of apartment houses is easily 
observed from Figure 6. The rapid construction focused on quantity of housing rather than 
quality as they continue. Currently many of these concrete blocks are quickly deteriorating 
and need either a great repair or demolition. During the 1980’s the focus on construction 
shifted into quality and improving living standards. Figure 6 shows that row houses seemed a 
trend for few decades and have lately been less popular. Most of housing stock in Finland is 
built in the 1970’s and 1980’s.  The economic state explains part of variation in construction 
behavior as explained with Figure 5, but other factors such as population growth have impact 
as Figure 6 suggests.  
Figure 6 Construction decades of current housing buildings by area 
This figure shows the construction decades of current housing buildings by building type and population in 
Finland. Values on the left-hand scale represent square meters of living space and the other scale is for 
population. The unsymmetrical time line comes with data limitations. With a stable time line the growth of 
construction from early on would be more visible as it is now. Source of data is Statistics Finland.     
 
Juntto (2007) reports survey results that 86 percent of Finnish people want to own a house 
while 63 percent actually own one. Thus one could say that Finnish people appreciate the 
                                                 
1
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value of owning a house. Another finding of this survey is that respondents on average want 
larger houses. Statistics Finland tells us that people have been able to follow this will. They 
report a steady increase in average house size from 60 square meters in 1970 to 79.8 square 
meters in 2011. However, this increase could also be explained by increased living standards 
of the Finns. A very high portion of the Finns (84 percent) are either very or quite satisfied 
with their current dwelling. Despite this result only 50 percent feel they are in dwelling where 
they target to live in.  
Another survey conducted by Tyvimaa & Kananen (2011) also reports that Finns are in 
general satisfied with their current housing. However, 47 percent of respondents answered 
positive when asked if they are considering moving in the following 12 months. Need for 
extra space is ranked the top reasoning for moving in this survey as well. The most important 
factor when looking for a new home was that the area surrounding is safe and secondly that 
the new home would feel safe to live in. This finding is also in line with the survey by Juntto 
(2007).  
The search process has also developed during the last couple of decades. This is mainly due to 
lowered search costs provided by online market places. Here, sellers may add photos and 
details of their commodity with contact information and possibility for dynamic pricing. 
Internet has been the main source of information and realtor finding for sellers already for 
many years in Finland (Uusitalo2008). He states that before the internet, the main marketing 
channel was the printed advertisements in newspapers. The shifting of consumption 
preferences has also lowered market entrance costs and we have witnessed a growth of new 
real estate agencies, many of which act in the internet only. We have also seen a formation of 
online market places that only post sellers’ advertisements and let buyers to contact the sellers 
directly without a realtor in between.   
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3 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The main characteristic of dwellings under interest in this paper is liquidity. Morawski (2008) 
lists 28 different definitions for the word liquidity collected from various online lexicons. 
When it comes to real estate, I find the definition of Wood & Wood (1985) a good one. They 
define real estate liquidity as “the inverse of the amount of time that elapses between the 
decision to sell a security and the receipt of the full market value by the seller.”  
Liquidity can be perceived as asset or market liquidity. Asset liquidity refers to time and costs 
required to liquidate a certain investment. There is a common agreement that many other 
financial assets like stocks are more liquid than any direct real estate investments. This 
derives from real estate characteristics such as heterogeneity and spatial fixity as discussed in 
the next chapter. 
What comes to market liquidity, real estate markets have features that prevent them to be as 
liquid as stock markets. Especially less populated areas, such as most of Finland, have fewer 
buyers and sellers acting at the same time. Even fewer are looking for a dwelling with exactly 
the features provided and therefore the supply and demand do not always meet. High 
transaction costs, segmentation and information asymmetries among other things delay 
transactions and lowers the market liquidity as discussed in the coming chapters. These 
principles go for real estate markets in general and can be applied to housing markets as well.  
3.1 DIFFERENCING CHARACTERS OF DWELLINGS AS INVESTMENT VEHICLES 
Like with other assets, houses should be priced with forecasted future cash flows (Oikarinen 
2007). However, buying a house differs a lot from buying another type of asset class. Firstly, 
people buy houses to have a shelter, a place to live. It doesn’t matter if it’s owned or a rental 
place, but they need to have one. This is an important feature that decouples dwellings from 
other investments. One notable problem with housing is that the seller has more information 
of the target than the buyer and the buyer may be unwilling to disclose the price she would 
pay for the dwelling (Kramer 1999) 
Dwellings are commodities as any, but the unique features discussed above and later on in 
this chapter explain why housing markets work quite differently from other commodity 
markets. Arnott (1987) lists many of these characteristics such as durability, spatial fixity, 
invisibility, complexity and non-convexities in production. Next I present features that 
crucially affect liquidity of dwellings in more detail. 
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3.1.1 HIGH TRANSACTION COSTS 
Transaction costs of houses derive from direct costs such as realtor fees and indirect costs like 
sale time as explained previously. Taloussanomat, a leading Finnish internet based business 
newspaper studied in 2009 the realtor fees for a €280 000 two-room apartment in central 
Helsinki. Results varied between circa 1-5 percent of purchase price (€2 440-€14 550).2 In 
Finland the sales profit is under same capital tax rate as stocks if the seller hasn’t lived in the 
house for two years. At this point the sales profit becomes non-taxable profit. A recent survey 
by Helsingin Sanomat, a major Finnish newspaper, shows the average commission rates for 
seven largest real estate agencies in Finland. They range from 2.42 to 3.66 percent from the 
transaction price. However, all agencies agreed that price should not be the only factor to 
consider when choosing an agency. Larger agencies tend to be more expensive, but offer 
wider networks and larger marketing machineries for their commissions.
3
  
According to e.g. Morawski (2008) trading activity should be weaker in markets with higher 
transaction costs. The higher the transaction costs, the longer marketing times should be 
observed. This is because sellers are reluctant to trade houses often if they have to face a large 
transaction cost each time. Yang & Yavas (1994), Frew (1985) and Jud et al. (1996) among 
others investigate the impact of real estate brokerage firms on market. They study e.g. if some 
brokers are quicker to sell or able to close a higher price. Vast majority of my data refers to 
transactions via real estate brokers, but I will not rank agencies as I have no data on them. 
One possible way of mitigating transaction costs is to sell a dwelling without an agent and 
save the realtor fee. This requires knowledge on valuating the dwelling as well as on the 
documents required and perhaps some eye for decorating a dwelling to attract potential buyers. 
The person would have to do marketing by herself. All of these are services you normally pay 
for the realtor to do. Direct costs of selling a dwelling alone are much lower than with the 
reported realtor fees above. I find several online market places that sell ad space for about 
€100-€200 with different service levels. They usually provide the customer with required 
documents, information of the selling process and guidance.  
3.1.2 SEGMENTED MARKETS 
Real estate markets can be divided into submarkets to allow a more detailed study. As the 
heading of this section says dwellings, I have already divided the whole real estate market 
                                                 
2
 http://www.taloussanomat.fi/tyo-ja-elama/2009/11/21/vedata-valittajaa-saasta-kymppitonni/200924210/139 
3
 http://www.hs.fi/talous/HS+selvitti+kiinteist%C3%B6nv%C3%A4litt%C3%A4jien+hinnat/a1305606469642 
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into submarkets and only chosen housing market. Others include e.g. business premises, 
public administration buildings and summer cottages. More important division of submarkets 
for my study is to separate submarkets inside a housing market. For instance, I could take a 
Finnish city and name it a housing market in a whole, because other cities may have 
completely different attributes resulting prices and marketing times. To get a better picture of 
the housing market in this city, I may have to divide it into submarkets if the markets do not 
seem homogeny. Rest of this chapter only discusses housing markets as it is the focus of my 
study.   
Academics agree that housing markets usually derive of a set of submarkets. The most 
common way to distinguish a submarket is to divide the market according to geographical 
areas or characteristics of dwellings (Bourassa et al. 2003). Geographical areas may be chosen 
e.g. by natural land lines, official city districts or compass directions. Michaels & Smith (1990) 
find that by following realtors’ actions it is possible to find their definition of submarkets in a 
certain market. They also interview realtors to find their opinion of submarkets and find them 
to be fairly consistent. Bourassa et al. (2003) argue that hedonic model and multiple 
regressions are often used for mass appraisal. These methods estimate housing prices pretty 
accurately and show if a market should considered as a whole or divided into submarkets.  
3.1.3 STABLE INCOME 
What comes to volatility of real estate investments, the income generated are more stable than 
stock index returns. Figure 7 shows annualized total and unlevered straight residential 
investment return in Finland from 1998 to 2011. It is divided into income return and capital 
growth. It is easy to observe, that the income return has remained very constant in comparison 
to capital growth. In fact, the standard deviation of income return during this period is only 
0.4 percent whereas it is 3.2 percent for the capital gain. When compared with stock market 
and bond returns, one can hold the income return as dividends or coupons on the underlying 
capital. To understand the low volatility of housing investments, Nyberg (2009) calculates 
Helsinki Stock Exchange standard deviation to be 32.7 percent and nominal return 18.7 
percent from 1912 to 2007.  
Total annual return on residential investments is annualized of monthly returns that are 
calculated with 
15 
 
 
    
                            
              
  
(1) 
 
where TRt is the total monthly return of month t and CVt is the capital value in the end of t. 
Cexpt are the capital expenditures within month t and Crect are the capital receipts within 
month t. NIt is net income within month t. To calculate annual return, monthly returns are 
indexed and the percentage change is observed. 
   [(
     
  
)   ]      
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Figure 7 Annual total return of straight Finnish residential markets investments 
This figure shows yields of straight Finnish residential markets as a sum of income return as rents and capital 
growth as asset appreciation 1998-2011. Annual capital growth and income return may sum imperfectly to total 
return due to the cross product that occurs when capital and income returns are combined within compounded 
total return. The data is collected by KTI Kiinteistötieto Oy. 
 
3.1.4 HETEROGENEITY 
Dwellings are heterogeneous and there are no two exactly alike. Buyer preferences determine 
what type of dwelling she wants and if there is no such dwelling available at the moment, the 
purchase delays. On the other hand, it may be for the seller that there is no buyer willing to 
buy her dwelling or her idea of the price differs from the buyer’s.  
3.2 PRICING 
This study is not about pricing of dwellings, but since pricing highly correlates with 
marketing time I will quickly go through major aspects of it. House price is affected by many 
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macro and micro level factors. Interest rates, employment rate and future forecasts among 
others affect both the supply and demand. As discussed in next chapter, heterogeneity of 
houses and people preferences drive the local demand of houses as well as location and 
buyer’s ability to pay. My research question on submarket is about these differences of 
preferences across a market area.  
Hedonic pricing is one widely used tool when considering housing price formation. It 
explains the value of a house e.g. in one market as a sum of the house’s features as estimated 
from a larger group of houses. These models may predict large portions of the whole value, 
but leave features hard to put into numbers such as view outside out of analysis. The hedonic 
model also gives statistical reliability of the results. Sirmans, Macpherson and Zietz (2005) 
observe the most used independent variables to be floor area, dwelling age, lot size, garage 
spaces and fireplaces. They base the result on 125 studies on hedonic housing pricing models. 
As I mention in the introduction, most of housing studies are conducted with US data and this 
affects the choice of variables in the analyses. Again, heterogeneity and submarkets may 
lower the actual purchase price if only few potential buyers exist. 
Other pricing method include repeat sales model, where price movements are observed from 
repeated sales of same houses. These models don’t provide information on the value of 
individual house characteristics or on price levels, but have the advantage of being based on 
actual transactions prices. On the other hand, houses may have gone through renovations 
which may have changed the value attributes of the house. Malpezzi (2002)  
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Figure 8 The four quadrant model 
The four quadrant model in this figure, introduced by diPasquale & Wheaton (1996), shows the equilibrium in 
housing market and explains how markets react to shocks both in asset and property market.  
 
 
Housing markets, like other asset markets, should be in equilibrium in the long run. This 
means that supply and demand are equal. However, real estate markets are somewhat less 
liquid than most other markets in the short run. Short term supply is very inelastic due to long 
construction time of new houses and sticky prices of houses that don’t always follow the true 
value among others. This causes strong short term cycles and enables price development 
predictability. DiPasquale & Wheaton (1996) explain how the short term equilibrium is found.  
In the model the housing markets are divided into asset market and property market. Asset 
markets derive from asset pricing as shown in the Figure 8. Value of a house here is net rent 
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divided by i, which represents interest rate, risk premium and expected increase in rents (as in 
Gordon growth model, published in 1959). Property markets derive from fact that one area’s 
shortage of housing may not be fully replaced by supply of an area far away. While one area 
faces incline in prices, may another area suffer from contradictory effect. This would mean 
there are submarkets within markets that are in my focus as well. This again explains why this 
model should be used only in a certain (sub) market at a time to see the full effects.  
Briefly, the model has following suggestions linking asset market and property markets 
together: 
1) Level of rents affect price level of houses 
2) Price level of houses affects the amount of construction 
3) Amount of construction affects property stock adjustment 
4) Property stock adjustment affects the level of rents 
Let’s assume that there is a local shock in a market that increases demand on rental housing. 
Because supply is inelastic in the short term, rents grow and value of properties increases. 
This signals markets to construct new housing, but since this takes a long time to do and thus 
to fill the demand, markets remain imbalanced for a while. When new housing is constructed 
the property stock increases and a new equilibrium is found.  
This model also explains the problem of urbanization as mentioned earlier. When demand of 
rental housing in country side decreases, it lowers both rents and construction. Risk premium 
increases as the P=  
 
  slope bends upwards decreasing housing values.  
3.3 STUDIES ON TIME ON MARKET 
Studies in this field mainly base on applications of micro economical search theory. Search 
theory studies buyers and sellers who must search for a partner before able to trade. This 
theory was first used in labor market research and later spread to many fields of research 
Mortensen (1986). Thus, real estate papers study the search of a buyer and seller for real 
estate. One key study point here is the time that it takes for those two actors to find each other 
and to trade. In general, Krainer (1999) says that the time required to sell a house is one of 
most studied fields in real estate economics and theories have evolved around this question. 
Most studies on sale time (see e.g. Springer (1996), Asabere et al. (1992) or Kang & Gardner 
(1989)) investigate the relationship between sale time and dwelling pricing or changes in 
pricing. They focus in active pricing and how it affects the probability and time to sell. 
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Older literature on these subjects clearly suffers from lack of data or tools for handling a 
bigger data set, because their datasets consist of only hundreds of sales. Nevertheless, 
theoretical models were constructed, but only later they could be tested with a larger sample. 
Younger studies seem to have rejected many of older suggestion which has to do with larger 
samples, but also with developed techniques.  
Belkin et al. (1976) study 1 000 transactions over a time span of four years to conclude that 
TOM is an important descriptor of how markets behave, but that house features do badly in 
predicting TOM. Nevertheless they find some features that are consistently correlated with 
longer or shorter TOM, which they explain with consistency in pricing errors. They also 
conclude that differences for various submarkets were so significant that an analysis of 
submarkets is necessary. In 1974 Cubbin studies a sample of 83 transactions and finds that 
lower priced houses sold the quicker the higher the price was set. He says it’s because buyers 
reflect the price to quality and don’t want to buy a low quality house. Another interesting 
finding was made by Miller (1978). He presents a theory that with increased TOM, sellers 
would increase the nominal price of houses to receive a constant real price (inflation was a lot 
higher than currently). Using a sample of 91 properties he finds promising results, but they 
were insignificant to support his hypothesis. Kang & Gardner (1989) tested the Miller 
hypothesis among two other hypotheses and with a larger sample. They cannot confirm the 
Miller hypothesis, but they find that at times of low interest rates it is better to sell quickly, 
whereas with high interest rates it is for benefit to wait longer to obtain a higher price. They 
also find that overpriced and older houses took more time to sell. However, this phenomenon 
does not occur in case of low priced houses. They interpret that these houses a more of a kind 
in the first place.   
Kluger & Miller (1990) construct a liquidity measure based on Cox proportional hazard 
technique and analyze their 103 transaction sample with it. This model shows how much 
more likely is it to get a house sold with any given feature. For example, they show that an 
additional bed room increases the probability of sale at any given day with 47 percent. They 
interpret the number to be a measure of liquidity added by the extra bedroom.
4
 The writers 
point out that this model only works with houses sold near market value. Haurin (1988) 
applies the search theory to study whether more atypically houses have longer TOM than 
standardized houses. With his sample of 219 transactions he performs a hazard function 
                                                 
4
 The writers have only five independent variables in this model, thus it serves as an example only. 
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analysis to confirm the research question. Atypical houses may attract fewer buyers and their 
valuation is more demanding and inaccurate to perform than for a house with lots of other 
houses to compare with.  
Asabere et al. (1992) study the optimal time on market for houses, thus the tradeoff between 
selling price maximizing and TOM minimizing. They find that both overpricing and 
underpricing prevent of achieving an optimal TOM. This means that the optimal TOM should 
come with market pricing. Spinger (1996) studied the effect of seller motivation to TOM. He 
finds that eager sellers (job loss, divorce etc.) sell at discount, but finds decreased TOM only 
with foreclosures. This result tells that it is possible to find a house at discount if one can 
identify the eager seller. Auctions can be used to leverage the price of house sold as high as 
possible, but costs of setting up the auction may be larger than the gain (Morawski, 2008). 
Ashenfelter and Genesove (1992) find that in the auction they studied sellers got highest 
profits for dwellings sold early on in the auction. If the negotiation lasted longer and required 
face to face discussions the agreed price was 13 percent lower.    
Krainer (1999) develops a search model where prices and liquidity are endogenously 
determined. He defines real estate markets to be hot when liquidity improves with selling 
volumes and cold when vice versa. One reason preventing hot markets to turn too hot is that 
sellers like the shorter selling times of hot markets and are willing to sell instead of waiting 
for a higher bid with a risk that markets would turn cold while waiting. Following the same 
logic, when markets are cold the sellers do not drop prices to achieve liquidity of hot markets, 
but wait for the markets to turn. Prices are sticky causing the longer sale times. Genesove and 
Mayer (2001) explain how the disposition effect on housing markets affects sale times. People 
facing losses set the price higher than market price thus allowing the sale time to increase. 
Kaustia (2010) says that there is a strong correlation on housing markets between trading 
volume and price levels. He argues that the disposition effect might have a significant impact 
on this correlation. Einiö, Kaustia and Puttonen (2008) study the Finnish markets and the 
disposition effect as well. With a repeated sales model, they find that number of sales 
occurring exactly at the original purchase price of the dwelling is unusually high. They also 
record a significant amount of loss aversion, especially in the greater Helsinki area. The 
disposition effect helps us to understand how housing markets work and how psychology has 
an important role on them. 
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3.4 STUDIES ON SUBMARKETS 
Search theory also helps to understand why certain markets may divide into multiple 
submarkets. Submarket is formed by characteristics of the area and dwellings there as well as 
by local consumer motivations and behavior. This means consumers in different submarkets 
may have different attributes they look for and thus never find each other. They may also 
react differently into economic shocks thus acting differently e.g. with buying decisions. 
If two houses in the same submarket are identical or made identical with pricing, they should 
remain the same time on the market (Belkin et al. 1976). They argue that regressions with 
house features cannot be used in predicting TOM unless some features of houses are 
consistently over- or underpriced.  Housing markets consist of buyers and sellers (demand and 
supply) and the more you narrow the market into submarkets, the more this relationship may 
vary affecting TOM. If a seller promotes a house for sale in a certain submarket, the writers 
remind that the demand is not all potential buyers in that submarket. Not all are in search of a 
house at that time and of those who are, only some are looking for the type of house you are 
selling. The supply consists of other houses in the same submarket appealing to same buyer 
candidates. Belkin et al. (1976) define submarket to consist of houses that affect each other’s 
prices, thus are competing with each other.  
Submarkets are an explanatory factor of many study results (see e.g. Kluger and Norman 
1990 or Belkin et al. 1976), but not in the main focus. Pryce and Gibb (2006) made an 
interesting study where they tried new and more accurate than before methods to analyze 
submarkets and TOM with Scottish data. New methods account for censoring and duration 
dependency observations that I will cover in the method section. They show that duration 
dependency is related to market cycle and submarket structure, but argue that not all 
implications are known. They suggest all further regression studies to be made with multiple 
submarkets unlike the earlier ones, as I will do.  
Bourassa et al. (2003) find that submarkets have a significant impact on pricing accuracy in 
their analysis. Not only do submarkets matter, but geography is what makes them matter. 
“Location, location, location” is not just a tired dictum as they conclude.  
3.5 BEHAVIORAL PATTERNS 
Third research question of this study investigates behavioral patterns in the data. Finding a 
clear pattern, let’s say that on Monday people list twice as many houses on market than on 
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other days, would raise an interesting question of the causes to this. Behavioral finance is a 
field of study that usually looks at stock market anomalies on a psychology-based theory 
approach. It is a study of human fallibility in competitive markets (Shleifer 2000). Aside from 
the limited arbitrage theory, the other sentiment of behavioral finance is investor sentiment. 
This is a theory of how investors form their beliefs and valuations or simply how people think 
like Ritter (2003) puts it. I apply the theory of behaving rational to distribution of housing sell 
and buy decisions.  
Redman et al. 1997 study calendar anomalies with REITs (real estate investment trust) and 
stocks. These anomalies are January effect, the turn-of-the-month effect, the day-of-the-week 
effect and the pre-holiday effect. They find positive results for all of these anomalies and 
motivate me to try these patterns on Finnish markets. I will not measure returns, but amounts 
of transactions and advertisements. Trading volume creates return at least with stock markets 
as suggested e.g. by Deo et al. (2008). I don’t find a single paper that would investigate 
similar patterns as I will with real estate.  
I also test the data for search criteria biases. Today it is highly common to search for housing 
on the internet and online market places allow people to limit the scope of their search. I study 
whether this search criteria limitation affects the TOM of dwellings. Since consumers limit 
their searches to match criteria they are looking for, they might lose the options very close to 
selected criteria thus decreasing probability of sale for those houses. Let’s say a dwelling A is 
listed with a price of €299 999 and dwelling B €300 000. Dwelling A would fit a search 
criteria with a price under €300 000, but B not. Dwelling B might be just as appealing to the 
customer, but is left out of analysis for €1 price difference. If this test succeeds to find 
statistically significant results this would mean that the seller can affect the expected TOM 
with cosmetic price setting or have a reason to get the dwelling area re-measured. I try to find 
published papers of search criteria with other commodities, but unfortunately do not find a 
single one I could use. 
3.6 EVENT STUDIES 
As the name reveals, event studies study the effect of a certain event using adequate data. It is 
widely used in many fields of research. In finance, researchers measure firm specific and 
economy wide events such as earnings announcements or change in unemployment rate. 
(MacKinley 1997) Most of finance related event studies search for price effects around and 
during an event. 
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My application of event studies relates to local economic shocks on the housing market. The 
difference to main stream of event studies is that I don’t look into price effects, but rather 
focus on TOM of houses and how this is affected by various local shocks such as the local 
employment rate. In addition, I’m capable of seeing whether shocks affect the number of new 
listings. A number of academic papers have recorded correlations of economic measures and 
TOM. In his empirical study Krainer (1999) manages to link TOM of houses with effective 
interest rate and the job growth rate. He calculates relative odds ratios for 7 percent effective 
interest rate (1.34) and for 10 percent (0.55). During his study period of 1992-1998 the 
average effective interest rate is 8 percent. This result means that at the time of 7 percent 
effective interest rate it is 1.34 times more likely to sell any house than with the average of 8 
percent. The average job growth rate was 1.9 percent and given a value of 3.5 percent the 
relative odds ratio was 1.18.  
Anglin (2006) studies how an individual seller reacts to changes in market conditions. As a 
conclusion he says that all changes in market conditions change either the level or the slope of 
the price-probability locus; the relationship between the price received and the ease of selling. 
These changes may force the seller to adjust her selling strategy affecting the outcome. He 
acknowledges this not to be an empting study, but serves a great supplement to traditional 
studies that omit market condition measures. A similar type of study was performed by Cheng 
et al. (2009). They show that sellers with constraints receive a lower price partly due to hurry 
in the selling process. As they conclude, longer TOM does not simply lead to higher prices. 
For example Taylor (1999) finds a negative correlation between selling price and TOM. 
Evans and Lyons (2008) study effects of macro shocks to DM/$ currency ratio over a four-
month period. They find that about 20 percent of the total effect variation is due to the news 
directly and some two thirds of was transmitted via order flow.   
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4 METHODOLOGY 
In this section I will go through methods I use to answer my research questions. I also present 
the literature using the same methods and rationale behind them. First I introduce the basics of 
the hazard model and then the applications that I use in this thesis. I end the section with 
introduction to hedonic regression. 
4.1 HAZARD AND SURVIVAL MODELS 
Pryce and Gibb (2006) argue that TOM cannot be analyzed as other continuous variables. 
This is because TOM is a duration-variable and subject to time-dependency and censoring. 
Time-dependency means that the probability of sale at any given moment may correlate with 
the time it has already been on the market. The writers argue that traditional approaches such 
as logit and probit regressions that hold the probability of sale independent perform worse in 
estimation. They also argue that multiple regressions overlook local dynamics. Other authors 
have detected the same problem arguing that both of these characteristics (censoring and time-
dependency) are overlooked by the widely used ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage 
least squared (2SLS) methods (see e.g. Miller 1978, Kang and Gardner 1989 or Asabere et al. 
1993). Pryce and Gibb (2006) say methods that account for these newly recognized 
characteristics are known as duration models and largely developed in the medical statistics 
literature. Models can be used for example to compare results of a group given a medicine to 
another with placebo medicine.  
I use hazard models for my first two research questions. Hazard model specifies me the time t 
probability of an event occurring at time T, given that the event has not yet occurred. 
Formally, h(t) is the hazard function at time t: 
            
                
  
  
(3) 
  
where T is the time of failure or retrieval from market in my case.  
The survival function shows the fraction of observations that have not yet been retrieved form 
the market at time T. Kaplan-Meier model allows a straight forward process of estimating the 
survival function directly from the continuous survival or failure times without noticing the 
time of the observation.  
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There are many applications of hazard models used in different papers. These models take 
housing and other features into account as well as time dependency. Each of the methods 
specifies a particular shape for the hazard rates. Choosing the wrong model may cause 
problems with the result and it is better to use more than one model to get reliable results. 
Krainer (1999) uses three applications that predict the probability of sale depending on the 
aggregate state of the economy. With these, he studies statistically significant relationships 
between the marketing times and variables such as employment growth and interest rates. 
These models may be applied for housing features as well. First there is an exponential hazard 
that the writer introduces as an easy model to estimate the hazard curve. The second one, the 
Weibull model, is an application of the exponential hazard that takes time a dwelling has 
already been on the market into account. Thirdly, the Cox proportional hazard technique 
compares covariance of two houses with another parameter such as the employment rate as 
also used by (Kluger and Miller (1990). Next I’ll present all these models in more detail and 
summarize differences of these hazard models with Table 1. 
4.1.1 KAPLAN-MEIER 
Kaplan-Meier model allows me to calculate survival rates of marketed dwellings without 
additional independent variables or time dependency as introduced by Kaplan and Meier in 
1958. This method shows the survival rate i.e. the rate of houses not retrieved from market as 
a function of time and allows censored data.  
Let S(t) be the probability that a certain dwelling is not retrieved from market by time t. For a 
sample of N observations from this population, let the observed marketing times until 
retrieval of the sample be 
               (4) 
 
Corresponding to each ti is ni, the number at risk of being retrieved just prior to time ti, and ri, 
the number of retrieved at time ti. 
This model is the nonparametric maximum likelihood estimate of S(t), a product of the form: 
 ̂    ∏
     
  
    
 
(5) 
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Without censoring, ni is the number of survivors just prior to time ti. With censoring, ni is the 
number of survivors less the number censored cases. Only surviving cases i.e. those that are at 
risk to be retrieved from market are observed. 
4.1.2 EXPONENTIAL HAZARD MODEL 
In the exponential hazard model, the hazard rate is in following form:  
          (6) 
 
This implies that the model assumes events to occur according to a Poisson function. It means 
that the risk of failure is flat with respect to time and past events won’t have an impact on 
following failures.  
4.1.3 WEIBULL MODEL  
The Weibull is a popular generalization of the exponential model, where the hazard rate is 
characterized as: 
             
   ,  (7) 
 
where 
    
       (8) 
 
The Weibull model allows for hazard rates vary over time. p is a parameter that determines 
whether the hazard is increasing ( p>1), decreasing ( p<1) or flat ( p=1) as in the exponential 
model above. For the housing market purposes I try different values of p, but the optimal 
model will assumingly have a p-value less than 1 for decreasing probabilities of “sale” over 
time. I assume this, because houses that sell later often have either a too high price of features 
potential buyers don’t appreciate and thus the probability of a sale with time lowers. Long 
sale times also drive customers away as they think there is something wrong with the house.  
4.1.4 COX MODEL 
As Krainer (1999), also Kluger and Miller (1990) use the Cox proportional hazard technique. 
The hazard function serves a basis to this proportional hazards model as it is also known. Let 
T be a random variable representing the length of time between the date when the house is put 
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on the market and the date when the house is sold, and let f(t) and F(t) be the probability 
density function and the cumulative probability density function of sale time. The hazard 
function, h(t), can be defined as:  
                    .  (9) 
 
Kluger and Miller (1990) say that the hazard represents the conditional probability of selling a 
house at time t, provided that the house has not sold until time t. The Cox model is based on 
the assumption that the hazard functions are proportional and that the proportionality constant 
depends on the explanatory variables. Thus, if h(t, X) is the hazard function representing the 
conditional probabilities of sale for a house with explanatory variables X, then the Cox model 
assumes that 
                     . (10) 
 
Beta represents Cox regression coefficients and h(t) is the baseline hazard function. Kluger 
and Miller (1990) continue that the baseline hazard represents the shape of the hazard 
function. It can be arbitrarily set to represent the hazard for any dwelling. The hazard function 
for other dwellings will be proportional to this baseline hazard function.  
They note that in this framework, the conditional probabilities of sale for any two houses are 
proportional, regardless of what time frame we are considering. Thus, if a house in one 
neighborhood has twice the likelihood of sale in its first week on the market than does a house 
in another neighborhood, then the first house is also twice as likely to sell in its second week 
in the market taken that both houses have not sold during the first week. This ratio of 
conditional probabilities is called the hazard ratio or relative odds ratio. The Cox assumption 
implies that the hazard ratios do not vary with time allowing us to estimate the proportionality 
factors without specifying the form of the baseline hazard function. For this reason, the Cox 
model is often called a semi-parametric method. The Cox model uses a likelihood approach to 
estimate the vector of beta coefficients from the hazard function. The model first forms the 
conditional likelihood function by considering the conditional probabilities of sale at each sale 
time in the sample. 
Suppose that at time tj one home in the sample, with explanatory variables Xj, was sold. Let 
R(tj) represent the set of observations with sale or censored times greater or equal to tj. The 
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probability that the house with Xj sells at tj, given that we know that one house actually sold at 
tj, is  
        {∑       }   
  
(11) 
where k indexes all the houses in R(tj). Call this probability Πj. According to the Cox 
assumption in equation 11, Πj reduces to: 
∏            ∑        ] 
 
 
  
(12) 
After this, I can form the conditional likelihood function by multiplying together the 
conditional probabilities Π1, Π2, Π3 etc. where the index represents each sale time in the 
sample, with the Π 's adjusted for overlapping sale times. Each Πj is formed using only the 
observations that might have been sold at each sale time j. Houses previously sold or censored 
houses would not be included in R(tj). The likelihood function is then maximized with respect 
to the beta coefficients to obtain the Cox model estimates. 
Table 1 Hazard models’ basic assumptions 
This table lists main differences of the three hazard models I use horizontally in the analysis part. 
Exponential model o Parametric model 
o Events occur following Poisson function 
o Does not take passed TOM into account 
 
Weibull model 
 
o Parametric model 
o Assumes a monotonic hazard decreasing (or increasing) 
probability of sale with time passing from market entrance 
 
Cox model 
 
o Semi-parametric model 
o Hazard function represents the conditional probabilities of sale 
for a house with given explanatory variables 
o Conditional probabilities of sale for any two houses are 
proportional 
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4.1.5 KERNEL-SMOOTHED HAZARD ESTIMATES 
For the submarket research I follow Pryce and Gibb (2006) and estimate the hazard curve 
using kernel-smoothened nonparametric estimates of the hazard function for different 
submarkets in cities of my sample. This model allows me to observe how the probability of 
sale develops with time. The hazard curves in figures of the results section are based on the 
following computation of the hazard of sale: 
                            ̂       ∑ 
 
   
(
    
 
)  ̂(  )  
  
(13) 
where   ̂̂ is the estimated change in the cumulative hazard, K() represents the kernel function, 
t−   are analysis time intervals, b is the bandwidth
5
 and the summation is over the D times at 
which failure occurs. This nonparametric approach does not constrain the hazard function to 
follow a particular analytical shape, so I can get a genuine picture of how the hazard function 
shifts over time and across submarkets.  
Pryce and Gibb develop their model by combining graphical approach by Klein and 
Moeschberger with life tables and likelihood tests of changes to the hazard function. Life 
tables are derived by grouping data into analysis time intervals given by   , where j=1,...,J. 
Each interval contains the frequency of sale or censoring for the group of dwellings under 
consideration. The number of dwellings where    <=T <  +1, where    is the analysis time of 
failure or censoring for property j. The maximum likelihood estimate of the within-interval 
hazard reported in the life tables is given by  
   
  
   
  
 
          
   (14) 
 
 where    =   /  ,    is the number of failures during the interval,    =    –  /2,    is the 
number of properties still alive at the start of the interval and   is the number of censored 
                                                 
5
 Bandwidth controls the smoothness or roughness of a density estimate. Pryce and Gibb state that their results 
are not sensitive to selected bandwidth, but I will test robustness of the model with various values. In general, a 
low bandwidth does less smoothing of the estimates than a higher one. 
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observations during the interval. Confidence intervals for the estimated hazards are based on 
the following standard error suggested by Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002):  
      √
  {(       )      
  
 
  
(15) 
4.2. HEDONIC ESTIMATION 
Hedonic estimation handles housing as a set of features, a multi-dimensional differentiated 
good. When estimating TOM, all features have a contribution to TOM of the housing. 
Following this logic, when selling a house, the expected time-on-market is a sum of housing 
features, location and other variables affecting this time (Boyle and Kiel 2001). Most papers 
studying housing pricing use different modifications of hedonic forms to best fit their data and 
objectives (Laakso 1997). Anglin et al. (2003) also use hedonic regression to better 
understand their results along with hazard models. They find consistent coefficients with 
different models, but lower significance levels for the hedonic regression. 
Springer (1996) also uses the hedonic regression in his study of single-family housing 
transactions. He specifies the model for TOM as: 
        ∑     ∑      ∑     
 
     
   
 
     
 
 
   
 
(16) 
 
where Bi is a vector of model parameters, Ti is the TOM with i as the property, Hi as physical 
characteristics of property i, Mi represents market conditions at the time the property i was on 
the market, Oi describes motivations of the seller of property i and ei is the error term.   
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5 DATA 
In this section I introduce the data I use in the empirical part of this thesis. First I present the 
housing advertisement data with sources and adjustments to data. Then I continue by 
introducing other data and descriptive statistics. 
5.1 DESCRIPTION OF DATA AND SAMPLE FORMATION 
My set of housing data includes observations from three sources; Etuovi, Oikotie and 
Kiinteistömaailma. In addition, I have data on all houses sold by a certain group of brokers for 
a limited time span from asuntojen.hintatiedot.fi. Etuovi and Oikotie are both Finnish market 
leaders as online market places with ca. 45 000 and 35 000 houses on sale at the time of this 
study. These online market places contain both privately marketed houses and houses 
marketed via realtors. Yang and Yavas (1994) find no differences in TOM with the choice of 
a real estate agent. Also the commission rate and size of the agent firm are insignificant in this 
study. Thus the fact my sample includes multiple real estate agencies should cause no 
disturbance in the results. Kiinteistömaailma is one of the leading real estate agencies in 
Finland. Combining the three sources I have a very wide sample of dwelling advertisements 
in Finland. Observations include dwelling features such as price, size, location and housing 
form as well as marketing time and the time point of marketing. 
Time span of this study is from January 2004 to July 2012 and I have collected altogether ca. 
400 000 housing advertisements for the sample creation. I merge the three data sources with 
creating an identification cell in Excel that includes city, zip code, number of rooms, building 
type, area, floor and year of construction. I use this identification to erase advertisements of 
same dwellings present in two or more data sources as duplicates. To control for outliers I 
erase houses with less than 100€/m2 and prices over €10 million. I also remove 
advertisements without relevant data such as price, area or marketing time. After I control for 
overlapping and outliers the main sample consists of 275 304 observations. The data covers 
six major cities in Finland, namely Helsinki, Tampere, Turku, Oulu, Jyväskylä, Kuopio. 
These six cities belong to nine largest cities in Finland by population in end of August 2012 
(Statistics Finland). The initial data covers dwellings in surrounding towns or cities of Turku, 
Tampere, Oulu, Jyväskylä that I exclude using the zip codes as determinants. Some of these 
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observations are as far as 70km away from the actual city. For this procedure I use the zip 
code finder provided by the national postal office Itella
6
. This process is observable in Table 3.  
Asuntojen.hintatiedot.fi provides me with housing transaction data allowing me to match 
advertisements and actual trades. This is the only way I’m able to distinguish transactions 
from my sample. The service is publicly available and collects data on apartment building and 
row house transactions from four major real estate agencies. This means I won’t be able to 
match other building types or houses sold by individuals. Thus, the matched sample includes 
apartment house and row house transactions during the period of July 2011 to July 2012. 
Time span of this sample is too short for time related variable study, but serves a good basis 
for market analysis for its period of time. I use cities’ official web pages and Google maps to 
match city districts with zip codes for the Asuntojen.hintatiedot.fi data as it only includes the 
city district.  
I use three different sample variations for this study as presented with Figure 9. First I have all 
observations after cleaning up the data as the main sample. Then I use a sample that only 
includes unique observations to control for overlapping advertisements as strictly as possible 
with the data variables. This means the first sample has similar observations based on the 
identification. However, with my data, it is possible that I remove unique observations as 
overlapping advertisements. These are for example similar size apartments in a same 
apartment house that therefore have the same identification. Finally I use a subsample that I 
create by matching actual transaction data with advertisements as described above. This way I 
get a set of transactions with more available data for the observations. However, I don’t have 
censored observations in this sample. This is because I could have transactions my matching 
process does not recognize during the time span of this sample as well. If I would denote them 
as censored observation, the model would suffer. Also, if I take all advertisements from this 
time period, I cannot know if a dwelling is sold by an individual. Secondly, the hedonic 
model does not recognize censoring and the sample content would change with selection of 
model. To be able to match all possible transactions in the transaction data, I would need 
exact addresses or similar unique distinguishers that I do not have and also information on the 
individually sold housing. These assumptions are in line with Anglin et al. (2003).  
 
 
                                                 
6
 http://www.verkkoposti.com/e3/postinumeroluettelo 
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Figure 9 Sample formation 
This figure illustrates the data gathering process and formation of the three samples I use in the analysis. As a 
notice, all samples include same observations, thus all matched observations are also present in the two other 
samples. 
 
5.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF HOUSING DATA 
In this section I describe the data I use in the empirical part. I start with TOM distribution and 
continue with observation statistics. Lastly I introduce the process of submarkets creation 
based on the postal codes.  
Figure 10 Frequency distribution of TOM in 2004-2011 
This figure shows how TOM of delisted dwellings in the main sample has distributed in weeks from listing from 
2004 to 2011. On the vertical axis I count the number of delisted dwellings and on the horizontal axis TOM in 
weeks. The figure shows data of dwellings that have delisted in one year’s time. N=275 304. 
 
Figure 10 indicates that majority of houses sell relatively fast, within few weeks. As 
observable, the trend after a year is seemingly flat and therefore the figure data is cut to TOM 
less or equal to one year.  An interesting finding is the high number of housing sold during the 
first week.  
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Figure 11 Average TOM in days for sample years 
This figure shows the average TOM in days for each sample year 2004-2012, separately for the unique sample 
and the main sample.   
  
When I compare main sample to unique sample in Figure 11, with about the half of 
observations, I find the yearly average TOM to be fairly constant between the samples. On 
average, the unique sample has somewhat lower TOM which could simply be a result of the 
lower amount of observations, thus lower number of extreme high values of TOM as well.   
Table 2 summarizes main descriptive statistics for the main sample and the matched sample 
observations. This comparison is to identify if the matched sample consists of similar 
observations than the larger samples or if certain biases exist. As I reason with Figure 11, the 
larger sample has higher standard deviations and means for all shown variables except for the 
price per square meter. This variable has increased throughout the main sample time span and 
since matched observations are from years 2011 and 2012 this result is logical.  
Table 2 Descriptive statistics  
This table shows means, standard deviations, minimums, medians and maximums for the main sample and the 
matched sample (in parentheses). Higher variations in values of the main sample are explained both by the 
sample size and a much longer time period. N=275 304 (4 353).  
Variable  Mean Std. dev. Minimum Median Maximum 
 
TOM  89 127 1 48 2 989 
  (57) (80) (1) (28) (1 322) 
Asking price in €  185 916 171 176 10 000 145 000 6 200 000 
  (175 322) (119 163) (10 468) (146 900) (1 750 000) 
Area in m2  71 37 10 64 990 
  (61) (25) (16) (58) (269) 
Price per m2    2 628 1 350 108 2 338 19 643 
  (2 952) (1 418) (141) (2 634) (10 980) 
Year of construction 1975 27 1809 1975 2012 
  (1970) (24) (1872) (1970) (2012) 
0
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35 
 
 
In Table 3 we see distribution of dummy variables in the main sample compared to matched 
sample. As I earlier mentioned, Helsinki has a dominant position in both samples. Apartment 
buildings dominate the building type category which is natural as the samples consist of 
dwellings in biggest cities of Finland. Both categories go pretty well hand in hand between 
the two samples. Only distinction is the larger share of Helsinki dwellings, seemingly from 
Oulu dwellings, in the matched sample that seems to result into higher fraction of apartment 
houses as well. What comes to other listed dummy variables, the percentage amount of houses 
with elevators and balconies is on the same level, but the main sample observations tend to 
have saunas more often in relation. 
Table 3 Dummy variables 
 
This table shows distributions of location and season as absolute amounts and relative percentages. Housing type 
“other” includes wood houses, small apartment houses, separate houses, loft houses and others. N=275 304       
(4 353). 
  Main sample  Matched sample 
 
Variable  # of ads Percentage # of ads Percentage # Zip codes  
 
Location Helsinki 104 081 37.8 1 926 44.2 00100-00990 
Location Tampere 48 826 17.7 790 18.1 33100-33900 
Location Turku     36 385 13.2 581 13.3 20100-20960 
Location Kuopio  19 365 7.0 385 8.8 70100-70840 
Location Jyväskylä 22 232 8.2 375 8.6 40100-40820 
Location Oulu  44 415 16.1 296 7.0 90100-90800 
 
Building type apartment 203 958 74.1 3 707 85.2 
Building type row house 39 134 14.2 502 11.5 
Building type detached house 15 791 5.8 15 0.3 
Building type semidetached  8 345 3.0 86 2.0 
Building type other 8 076 2.9 43 1.0 
 
 
Elevator  112 004 40.7 1 863 42.8  
Sauna  57 334 20.8 322 7.4 
Balcony  149 796 54.4 2 403 49.8 
 
 
Table 4 summarizes the time related distribution of the main sample and the matched sample. 
I define all four seasons to consist of three months as widely used in Finland
7
. Winter 
includes December, January and February. March, April and May are spring months whereas 
summer months are June, July and August. This listing leaves September, October and 
November for the fall period. In Table 5 I list the economic and demographic data I use in the 
tests to study the housing market characteristics.   
                                                 
7
 http://ilmatieteenlaitos.fi/vuodenajat 
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Table 4 Distribution of observations in time  
This table shows the distribution of sale advertisements in weekdays, months, and years for the main sample and 
the matched sample. 
  Main sample  Matched sample 
 
Variable   Retrieved ads New ads Retrieved ads New ads  
Monday  46 590 23 552   698 439  
Tuesday  52 779 42 125   767 573  
Wednesday  51 709 53 224   728 744  
Thursday  52 409 61 715 821 1 101  
Friday  44 651 61 550 654 1 047  
Saturday  17 054 26 832 462 370  
Sunday  10 112 6 306    223  79  
  
January  23 521   23 341   466  267  
February  25 639   23 114   250 121  
March  24 343   25 094   157 195  
April  22 317   23 605   122 225  
May  27 172   29 328   577 749  
June  20 763   22 975   355 380  
July  19 203   18 851   268 337  
August  23 391   23 260   463 466  
September  24 767   25 440   433 518  
October  23 955   24 407   441 429  
November  23 217   22 585   523 409  
December  17 016   13 304   298 257  
 
Year -2003   1 179    
Year 2004  11 195 15 051   
Year 2005  26 056 25 966   
Year 2006  32 751 37 246   
Year 2007  40 102 42 362   
Year 2008   40 176 40 879    1   
Year 2009  36 092 29 617    3    
Year 2010  34 922 36 616    79   
Year 2011  37 998   37 172   2 780 3 309  
Year 2012 (5months only) 16 012   9 216     1 573 961 
 
Winter  66 176 66 191 1 014 645 
Spring  73 832 73 844 856 1 169 
Summer  63 357 63 378 1 086 1 183 
Fall  71 939 71 969 1 397 1 356 
 
Beginning of month 90 757   96 215 1 510 1 700  
Mid-month  89 925   93 061 1 341 1 422  
End of month  94 622   86 028 1 502 1 231  
     
 
5.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF OTHER DATA  
I have collected a selected set of economic and demographic data for the six cities under 
investigation. Table 5 includes these variables with their collection frequencies.   
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Table 5 Economic and demographic data 
This table shows selected economic and demographic data and its collection frequencies. The data comes from 
Statistics Finland. 
Variable    Frequency  
 
Total emigration (net)    Yearly 
City to another city migration (net)   Yearly  
Within city migration   Yearly 
Natural population growth (net)   Yearly 
 
Unemployment rate   Monthly 
Average m2 price in the city   Quarterly 
 
 
 
Table 6 shows how the submarkets are formed. I base formation of submarkets on official city 
practices and categories used by Statistics Finland to get reasonable yet different areas for 
comparison. City of Helsinki justifies their division principles as follows: Sections should 
form natural service areas according to residents. Areas should be relatively similar in 
population and area limits should follow official city district lines. Division should also be 
permanent to enable comparison in time. I limit my study on submarkets to two major cities 
Helsinki and Tampere. These two should demonstrate clear answers for my research question 
and further cities would not bring added value for the study.  
Table 6 Description of selected submarkets 
In this table I list cities and selected submarkets for my analysis. I divide cities into a reasonable number of 
submarkets according to official division of districts. Selected submarkets don’t necessarily cover every city 
district. Zip codes included in selected submarkets are presented in Table 7. 
City  Name  Number of advertisements  
 
Helsinki  Southern  24 930 
  Western  11 735 
  Inner  17 050 
  Eastern  16 955 
  Northern  17 246 
 
Tampere  Southern  11 371 
  Western  8 591 
  Eastern  9 555   
  Inner  17 000 
 
 
In Table 7 I show how I put the selected submarkets together. I use the zip code as a selection 
variable and based compile submarkets based on official city guidelines and own perspective 
to get different types of submarkets from the two cities. As a notice, I could conduct my 
submarket study with single zip codes as well, but choose to have larger areas instead.  
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Table 7 Formation of selected submarkets 
In this table I list the zip codes included into selected submarkets. Formation of submarkets follows official city 
guidelines. Not all zip codes of selected cities are included, as the aim is to produce homogeny samples. 
Submarket  Zip codes 
 
Helsinki- Southern 00100, 00120, 00130, 00140, 00150, 00160, 00170, 00180, 00190, 00200, 00210, 00250, 
00260 
 
Helsinki- Western 00330, 00340, 00350, 00360, 00370, 00380, 00390, 00400, 00410, 00420, 00430, 00440  
 
Helsinki- Inner  00230, 00240, 00500, 00510, 00520, 00530, 00550, 00580, 00610 
 
Helsinki- Eastern  00900, 00910, 00920, 00930, 00940, 00950, 00960, 00970, 00980, 00990 
 
Helsinki- Northern 00630, 00640, 00650, 00660, 00670, 00680, 00690, 00700, 00710, 00720, 00730, 00740, 
00750, 00760, 00770, 00780, 00790 
 
Tampere- Inner  33250, 33240, 33230, 33200, 33210, 33100, 33180,33500,33520,33540 
 
Tampere- Western 33340, 33420, 33330, 33310, 33300, 33270, 33400 
 
Tampere- Eastern  33530, 33560, 33700, 33580, 33730, 33710 
 
Tampere- Southern 33900, 33800, 33820, 33840, 33720, 33850 
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6 RESULTS 
In this section I present the analysis of my data with results. First I test features of the 
dwellings, their location and other available data to find determinants of time on the market. 
Then I divide the markets in my sample into submarkets to study the effect of submarket 
location to TOM. Finally, I will study the data for behavioral patterns. These include calendar 
and search criteria variables. As this study does not follow given guidelines or underlying 
papers, I have the possibility to take a closer look on interesting findings and direct the focus 
on areas of greatest interest. This applies to finding the most suitable form of tests as well. 
Every test is not highly important because of its results, but they all help finding the most 
suitable methods and assumptions for studying the Finnish housing market, in the future as 
well. Based on earlier literature, I cannot form many expectations as they focus on small 
towns or their submarkets and mainly in the US. These samples also face different regulations 
and market environments as my Finnish ones. However, certain results are more or less 
expected and I discuss possible reasons behind them during the analysis.   
6.1 DETERMINANTS OF TOM 
The first research question is about the determinants of TOM. Based on the variables, samples 
and selection of research methods I could have countless of different tests to study the 
markets. I try a lot of different variations and report the ones I feel have the most value for my 
objectives. As shown later on, even the smallest changes in settings, say controlling the test 
for a certain variable, can dramatically change the regression results. Next I show the results 
based on multiple sample and variable set selection as well as different models as presented 
earlier on. The very basic starting point of my analysis are the Kaplan-Meier estimates that 
show the fraction of houses not sold after n days from entering the market as plotted in Figure 
12.  
This simplified figure should give the reader a framework of the approximated time on market 
of any houses. As we see, I have truncated the time horizon in the figure to 365 days, but 
already at around 200 days after entering the market, circa 90 percent of all houses are 
estimated to be sold. In other words, there are houses with long and extremely long selling 
times, but the majority of houses sell within reasonable times.  
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Figure 12 Kaplan-Meier estimates 
This figure shows the Kaplan-Meier estimates of the matched sample observations (n=4 353) with TOM of 365 
days or less. These observations cover 98.87 percent of all observations. This curve estimates the fraction of 
houses still on the market after n days from entering. This model does not give the exact estimations due to 
missing censored observations, but works well as a descriptive model.  
 
Table 8 demonstrates how the same set of variables run with three different sample settings 
and two different models affects TOM. This table is to give insight of the dependence of 
sample selection to results and about the fit of two different models. If I compare the Cox and 
hedonic models, they seem to give fairly similar results. Only differences in signs come with 
listing seasons, number of rooms and macro-economic factors. This applies also when 
comparing different sample results. 
Although the literature is strict about the hedonic model’s bad fit to housing environment, I 
show its results, because they are much easier to interpret than those of Cox’s model. With 
hedonic regression, dummy variables mean that TOM is affected by the dummy coefficient 
value in days, if present with a certain dwelling. With linear variables the interpretation is 
linear in days of TOM. What comes to hazard models’ coefficient interpretation, they measure 
relative probabilities of sale and the signs are the other way around as for the hedonic 
regression. This means that a positive coefficient of a hazard model decreases the expected 
TOM and a negative sign increases it. I run the same regressions with natural logarithm of 
debt-free price per square meter, but this results lower t/z-values and a lower R
2  
values for the 
hedonic models while having minimal other effects in all cases.  
Amount of statistically significant coefficients is about the same with all three samples and 
the Cox method seems to yield more of them in absolute terms. Larger samples have higher 
R
2
 values as the matched sample. This is due to larger sample size as well as explanatory 
power of the listing year and macro-economic variables that have limited capabilities in 
41 
 
 
explaining the variation in the matched sample, because of the short time span. What drives 
the matched sample to have about the same amount of significant coefficients could be that it 
consists of best observations in terms of sale probability. All observations in this sample are 
recognized as sold dwellings. Another observation is the low values of the hedonic model’s 
constants. These correlate highly with the independent variable selection as well as data 
transformation as I explain with Table 9. 
For the test shown in Table 8 I have clustered the data according to city of the dwelling. I do 
this for the macro-economic data that is city related. Without clustering the observations 
would not function properly as they would compare with other cities’ values. My purpose is 
to study within city changes in these parameters. However, clustering lowers t-values of all 
coefficients, thus reducing the value of other information and I will not use the macro-
economic data in further analyses. I try the test without controlling for the listing year and 
find the macro-economic data to lose its value in terms of statistical significance in the larger 
samples while the matched sample remains fairly untouched. This is natural, because the 
matched sample mainly consists of 2011 and 2012 listed dwellings. With the listing years I 
witness a doubled R
2
 for the main sample and the unique sample.  
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Table 8 Testing Cox and Hedonic models with different samples 
This table presents regression results on determinants of TOM using the Cox model and the hedonic regression 
methods for the different sample settings. Dependent variable is TOM in days. Figures in parentheses below the 
coefficients are the t- or z-statistics depending on the model and ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% levels respectively.      
  Main sample                     Matched sample               Unique sample 
 
Variable  Cox            Hedonic         Cox             Hedonic         Cox             Hedonic 
 
 
Ln (Debt-free asking price) -0.30***    43.80***        -0.17**       20.15**         -0.36***      45.29*** 
  (-14.99)     (9.15)              (-2.03)        (3.00)             (-21.14)      (18.40) 
Area  -0.01***    0.28***          -0.01**       0.25                -0.00***     0.24*** 
  (-11.83)     (7.23)              (-2.55)        (0.99)             (-14.73)      (8.50) 
(Apartment house) 
Row house  0.19***     -22.55**         0.31**        -34.69*           0.33***      -35.17*** 
  (2.77)         (-2.63)            (2.45)         (-2.44)            (5.52)         (-5.50) 
Detached house  0.42***     -54.80***       0.64**        -53.14*           0.37***      -51.70*** 
  (5.45)         (-5.63)            (2.21)         (-2.53)            (4.12)         (-4.55) 
Semi-detached house 0.19***     -24.06***       0.31***      -22.36**         0.27***      -36.85*** 
  (3.74)         (-3.15)            (3.32)         (-3.13)            (2.84)         (-5.04) 
Loft house  0.21            -2.40              0.28             -19.10            0.08***      -12.00*** 
  (0.93)         (-1.00)            (1.02)         (-1.29)            (3.72)          (-7.41) 
Wooden house  0.94**       -17.62***       -0.39           7.72                0.13***      -22.37*** 
  (2.13)         (-4.87)            (-1.54)        (0.35)             (4.61)          (-9.60) 
(Listing in winter) 
Listing in spring  -0.04*        5.24                -0.04           -0.68              -0.04           5.73 
  (-1.74)       (1.75)              (-1.23)        (-0.13)           (-1.15)         (1.31) 
Listing in summer 0.05            -3.33              -0.07***     4.42                0.04            -2.81 
  (1.20)         (-0.67)            (-2.64)        (1.28)             (0.72)          (-0.53) 
Listing in fall  0.08***     -7.87*             0.05            -5.57               0.09***      9.92** 
  (2.61)        (2.32)              (1.00)         (-1.14)            (3.98)          (3.69) 
(Helsinki) 
Tampere  -0.45***    31.22*            -0.36***     30.42***        -0.20***     22.85** 
  (-4.30)       (2.42)              (-9.26)         (8.05)            (-6.40)        (3.15) 
Turku  -0.73***    85.90**          -0.29***     20.24**          -0.23***    24.11*** 
  (-4.72)       (3.40)              (-5.40)        (3.42)             (-4.75)        (4.01) 
Oulu  -0.84***    91.21**          -0.27***     34.95***       -0.25***     26.89*** 
  (-6.38)       (3.29)              (-4.63)        (5.83)             (-10.18)      (10.18) 
Jyväskylä  -0.82***    94.21***        -0.32***     34.70***       -0.17***     20.01*** 
  (-7.83)       (4.92)              (-3.89)        (7.22)             (-17.87)      (11.10) 
Kuopio  -0.73***    81.28**          -0.27***     24.42***       -0.13***     13.37** 
  (-3.95)       (2.95)              (-3.93)        (6.02)             (-5.07)        (3.15) 
(Single room) 
Two rooms  -0.11***   1.41                 -0.22***     12.26**         -0.09***      -0.56 
  (-2.70)       (0.57)              (-4.48)        (3.02)             (-3.93)        (-0.45) 
Three rooms  -0.14***    4.75                -0.22***     14.00**         -0.11***      1.72 
  (-3.21)       (1.50)              (-3.37)        (2.85)             (-4.93)        (0.82) 
Four rooms  -0.17***    6.32                -0.27***     21.41              -0.09***    -3.29 
  (-3.13)       (1.35)              (-2.64)        (2.01)             (-3.26)        (-1.93) 
More than four rooms -0.08***    -2.24               -0.08           14.44              -0.02           -12.31** 
  (-2.99)       (-0.60)             (-0.70)        (1.40)             (-1.40)        (-3.48) 
Elevator  -0.04          1.54                0.16*          -16.84*           0.03***      -3.94** 
  (-0.56)       (0.67)              (1.88)         (-2.28)            (2.92)          (-2.80) 
Balcony  0.04           -3.38               0.19***      -15.40**         0.04*          -4.51 
  (1.56)        (-0.88)             (3.62)         (-2.72)            (1.77)          (-1.39) 
Sauna  -0.11***   4.55                 -0.14***     4.43                -0.16***    15.28*** 
  (-4.32)      (1.76)               (-3.82)        (1.67)             (-14.13)      (11.63) 
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Table 8 Testing Cox and Hedonic models with different samples (continued) 
  Main sample              Matched sample               Unique sample 
 
Variable  Cox            Hedonic         Cox             Hedonic         Cox             Hedonic 
 
 
Local unemployment (%) 0.03***     -3.38**           0.01***      -1.16**           0.04*          -4.20*** 
  (6.07)         (-3.19)            (2.67)         (-2.74)            (7.30)          (-4.18) 
Natural population change (%) -0.23          19.57              0.13            -29.00***       -0.08           2.90 
  (-0.54)       (0.48)              (0.89)         (-6.30)            (-0.17)         (0.06) 
City to city immigration (%) -0.92**      123.56*          -0.93*         94.96***        -0.80**       98.52* 
  (-2.53)       (2.30)              (-1.92)        (6.43)             (-2.10)        (2.09) 
Within city immigration (%) 0.08***     -10.57**          0.00            -0.52              0.08***       -9.53** 
  (3.04)        (-3.17)             (0.55)         (-0.96)            (2.98)          (-3.08) 
Net immigration (%) -0.94**      107.60             0.33***     -27.79***      -0.96***      88.11 
  (-2.30)       (1.55)              (3.39)          (-4.85)           (-2.75)         (1.69) 
Constant  -                 -272.37**       -                  -220.26**       -                  -317.98***
                    (-3.71)    (-2.73)                 (-7.75) 
Year of listing  Yes            Yes                 Yes             Yes                Yes              Yes 
  
R2  -                 0.150               -                 0.084              -                  0.153 
N                                                      275 304     275 304           4 353          4 353             142 316       142 316          
 
Next I focus on the coefficients of the test in Table 8. Below I list the independent variables 
and analyze their meaning and relationship with TOM. I concentrate on the hedonic 
regression results, as they have a straight forward interpretation. Overall, it is interesting to 
see that with some independent variable categories one model yields more significant 
coefficients than the other and the other way around.  As I earlier state, a comparison of 
results to earlier literature is not very informative. However, I compare certain results to 
papers studying housing prices as the interpretation of some variables is fairly similar: If we 
say that a certain feature, say sauna, increases the value of a house, it should also increase 
attraction, therefore shorten the TOM of that house, ceteris paribus.   
a) Ln(debt-free transaction price): More expensive housing tends to have longer TOM 
than less expensive ones. 
b) Area: The linear interpretation is the same as with the price: As a dwelling gets larger, 
it takes a longer time to sell it. A similar phenomenon is captured by many papers 
regressing determinants of housing prices, see e.g. Nikola (2011) or Moilanen and 
Terho (2010) 
c) City: The city, a dwelling is located in, plays an important part in this test. It is no 
wonder as the other cities reflect to Helsinki. Buyers and sellers may have different 
consumption preferences and also the average price levels differ from city to city 
resulting the coefficients to be significant. In all cases, dwellings in other cities than 
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Helsinki sell slower. Expected difference can be more than a month when looking 
from the matched sample results. 
d) Number of rooms: Here I find differences between the samples, although tendency is 
that single room housing sells quicker than housing with many rooms. The 
interpretation itself is also somewhat two-sided. First interpretation is that single room 
housing sells quicker than a mansion with tens of rooms. On the other hand, large 
single room housing may have less value to buyers than similar size housing with two 
rooms. When analyzing the cox results, I find all coefficients for multiple rooms to 
signal a longer TOM than with a single room dwelling. Most of the coefficients are 
also significant, so the two models clearly differ with these variables    
e) Building type: When compared to apartment houses, that represent the majority of 
observations, all other housing types sell faster. This finding is somewhat surprising, 
because apartment houses tend to be more homogeny than say detached houses. When 
testing TOM of different building types for descriptive statistics with the unique 
sample, I find that apartment houses have the shortest median TOM. However, due to 
highest standard deviation of results, the average is higher than for other building 
types resulting to observed coefficients.  
f) Sauna: All samples indicate that housing with saunas sell slower. As I hold sauna a 
value feature, it could be that saunas are usually found in more expensive or larger 
housing and therefore the coefficient is positive for a longer TOM. Nonetheless, the 
few square meters of space a sauna requires are not necessary to anyone, but 
something extra in a sense. A buyer can have a feeling she pays too much for these 
extra square meters if she does not appreciate sauna that much. 
g) Balcony: A balcony in a house lowers the expected sale time of that house, especially 
with the matched sample evidence.  
h) Elevator: Elevator receives contradictory results with different samples. Nikola (2011) 
or Moilanen and Terho (2010) both find apartments with an elevator to be more 
expensive, so I think there could be the same phenomenon as with the sauna. In 
addition, an elevator is more attractive to people living in upper floors, than for those 
having their apartments lower in the building.  
i) Macro-economic figures: Focusing in the two larger samples, I expected to find local 
employment correlating positively with expected sale time, whereas population 
change and immigration figures negatively. Increase in local employment should 
lengthen TOM, because of uncertainty leading people to postpone their purchase 
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decisions. Overall, immigration or increase in population should correlate positively 
with housing market liquidity. However, I find only immigration within a city to 
follow my logic. Main reason for this is probably the relatively small portions of 
absolute changes in relation to whole city populations. Thus the coefficients may 
capture effects I don’t see in my data leading to unexpected signs. With employment, 
another interpretation is that with people losing their jobs need to cut costs and find a 
cheaper housing to live in.  
For the most coefficients I get similar results with all samples and feel comfortable to 
continue the study with the matched observations. On the other hand, these results allow me 
to study the other samples in later tests, although transactions are not certain. This gives depth 
to my analysis as significance levels tend to increase with sample size as I show with Table 8 
and time related variation can be dealt with. In Table 9 I study the matched observations more 
closely, as they consist of additional data I cannot compare with the other samples, such as the 
transaction price and condition of dwelling. I test the sample with all four methods I introduce 
in the methods section to see their suitability for this type of analysis. Secondly, I show how 
dependent the results are on the method selection.   
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Table 9 TOM with matched observations 
This table presents regression results on determinants of TOM using the Cox, Weibull, Exponential and Hedonic 
regression methods for the matched sample. Dependent variable is TOM in days. Figures in parentheses below 
the coefficients are the t-statistics and ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively.  
  Cox Weibull Exponential Hedonic 
Variable  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  
 
 
Ln(Debt-free transaction price) 0.26** 0.29** 0.27** -12.32** 
  (2.14) (2.34) (2.21) (-2.05) 
Asking price-transaction p. (%) -0.23* -0.23* -0.22* 9.38 
  (-1.78) (-1.76) (-1.67) (1.38) 
Area  -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.49*** 
  (-5.15) (-5.32) (-5.02) (4.71) 
(Condition good) 
Condition satisfactory 0.07* 0.06* 0.06 -3.02 
  (1.82) (1.68) (1.61) (-1.59) 
Condition bad  0.35*** 0.40*** 0.37*** -12.57** 
  (3.62) (4.03) (3.77) (-2.54) 
(Single room) 
2 Rooms  -0.27*** -0.28*** -0.27*** 10.98*** 
  (-4.49) (-4.69) (-4.48) (3.66) 
3 Rooms  -0.29*** -0.31*** -0.30*** 12.54*** 
  (-3.19) (-3.46) (-3.33) (2.82) 
4 Rooms  -0.29** -0.32** -0.30** 12.23** 
  (-2.29) (-2.45) (-2.34) (1.97) 
4+ Rooms  0.16 0.19 0.17 -5.76 
  (0.81) (0.93) (0.85) (-0.58) 
(Apartment house) 
Row house  0.06 0.05 0.05 -7.90** 
  (0.82) (0.70) (0.77) (-2.07) 
Other building type 0.05 0.05 0.05 -5.34 
  (0.45) (0.46) (0.50) (-0.99) 
Sauna  -0.34*** -0.36*** -0.34*** 10.98*** 
  (-5.05) (-5.38) (-5.01) (3.18) 
Balcony  0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.72 
  (0.92)   (1.14) (1.01) (-0.35) 
Elevator  0.06 0.04 0.04 -3.65* 
  (1.36) (0.90) (0.88) (-1.74) 
Constant  - -11.00*** -10.27*** 1465.61*** 
   (-6.09) (-5.71) (16.31) 
Year of listing  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year of construction Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Zip code  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
# Observations  4 353 4 353 4 353 4 353 
R2  - - - 0.611 
p-value  - 0,93 - - 
 
If I analyze Table 9 purely as a comparison of methods I conclude the following: All three 
hazard models yield to basically same results. This goes with both the coefficients and their 
significance levels. Weibull regression tends to give somewhat higher significance levels as 
the other hazard models, but this does not apply to all coefficients. With these coefficients I 
also detect a higher coefficient value. The hedonic model gives same coefficient signs and 
47 
 
 
nearly same significance levels for each variable compared to the hazard models. As I 
discussed in the literature review, the results were expected to be similar and only small 
assumption differences between the hazard models result the cosmetic differences. What 
comes to comparison of this hedonic regression with the one in Table 8, I mainly find similar 
results, but some differences as well. Introducing additional control variables and other 
independent variables changes the model outcome.  
First coefficient that stands out from Table 9 is the transaction price. With all models, the test 
indicates a negative relation with price and TOM. This coefficient sign is not affected by 
selection of asking price or transaction price. I will take a closer look of this phenomenon 
with Figure 13 later on. Now I focus on the newly introduced independent variables in the 
model. Discount on selling price, calculated as (asking price-transaction price)/asking price, 
has a positive correlation with TOM in this test. This result is not expected, because the first 
thought is that a discount should lead to a quicker sale. However, when thinking about this, 
other commodities on sale in shopping centers etc. are usually on sale, because they have not 
sold with initial price.  
Applying this theory to housing, a seller should give a discount only if she has waited a long 
time and wants to get the dwelling sold quicker. But a seller with constraints will set the 
initial price low to sell quickly. Even so low that many buyers are attracted and the 
transaction price is actually higher than the listing price, still with a short sale time. Another 
added variable category is the condition. Compared to housing in good condition, satisfactory 
and bad condition housing tends to sell quicker. Especially, bad condition coefficient is highly 
significant with all four methods. Here again, I think this through with support of housing 
price studies. For example, Nikola (2011) finds that apartments in Helsinki that are in good 
condition are on average 15 percent more valuable than apartments in bad condition. 
Therefore, as my results generally suggest, cheaper housing tends to sell quicker. In addition, 
especially in Helsinki there seems to be a trend of property developing; buying apartments in 
bad condition to repair them and sell for profit.  
In Table 9, I have seemingly high coefficient values. This is because some dummy categories 
compare correlations with only few observations. If these few observations have a high value 
TOM on average, the correlations of dummy variables may differ highly from larger samples.  
As the clearest example I have the earliest year of listing for an observation the year 2008, but 
as we know the first transaction realized in 24.7.2011. Thus this observation must have a very 
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long TOM and since all other observation reflect to this, the coefficients of year of listing for 
other years with more observations are large as well as the constant. Simply by reducing year 
of listing in Table 9 I reduce the constant of the hedonic regression from 1465.61 to 379.30 
while maintaining all other coefficient signs and significance levels. As many as 76 percent of 
matched sample observation advertisements are put on the market in year 2011. In further 
tests I aim to control for these unpleasant coefficients with grouping of dummies as later 
explained. However, as my dependent variables cannot all be zero at the same time with it, 
the constant does not have an intrinsic meaning.  
In Table 10 I test the unique sample with different specifications of variables. I use the 
hedonic regression for this analysis for easier interpretation and comparison of scenarios. In 
addition to single coefficients, I’m interested to compare R2-values of the different scenarios. 
As I earlier explain, the selection and formation of dummy categories is essential to test 
results. With tests in Table 10 I have grouped the year of constructions into decades to reduce 
variation in the model caused by single years. In the second specification I transform the 
dependent variable into natural logarithm. For the independent variables I have two 
specifications as well: (1) all linear or dummy variables and (2) all natural logarithms or 
dummy variables. These specifications lead to four scenarios presented in Table 10.  
The results are generally highly significant and yield fairly similar R
2
 values. The only 
differences of coefficient signs come with sauna and the constants. The differentiating sauna 
coefficient is not significant, but an interesting finding is that the constant signs are positive 
for the specification (1), but negative for specification (2). This seems to derive from lower 
price and area values’ range or standard deviation with specification (2) as they are in natural 
logarithm form. This results to higher coefficients and therefore to lower constants as each 
euro and square meter of area increases the TOM. What comes to other dummy variables, 
they are constantly lower for specification (2) than for specification (1). The interpretation 
derives from the linear variable reasoning; as the range of linear variables increase, the 
dummy values increase to capture similar size effect than for lower linear dummy variables 
with specification (1). Specification (2) yields higher R
2 
values which I interpret to result from 
variable ranges to be more comparable. By this I mean that if I have, say a range of 1-200 for 
TOM and 10 000-2 000 000 for price, these categories are less comparable than if the price 
range is transformed into natural logarithm.  
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Table 10 Determinants of TOM with variable transformation 
This table presents regression results on determinants of TOM using the hedonic regression for the unique 
sample. Independent variables for the two specifications are: (1) all linear or dummy variables, (2) all natural 
logarithms of variables or dummy variables. Figures in parentheses below the coefficients are the t-statistics and 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
   (1) (2) (1) (2) 
   TOM as dependent variable ln(TOM) as dependent variable 
Variable   Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient 
  
 
Debt-free price   0.00***  0.00***  
   (25.07)  (15.10) 
Ln(debt-free price)   34.32***  0.23*** 
    (39.78)  (22.52) 
Area   0.25***  0.00*** 
   (17.62)  (22.74) 
Ln(area)    35.15***  0.63*** 
    (22.21)  (34.12) 
Number of rooms   3.13***  0.09*** 
   (8.15)  (19.73) 
Ln(number of rooms)   -19.10***  -0.14*** 
    (-14.31)  (-8.91) 
(Apartment house) 
Row house   -23.99*** -30.99*** -0.26*** -0.32*** 
   (-20.55) (-25.55) (-18.87) (-23.26) 
Detached house   -27.84*** -38.24*** -0.22 -0.31*** 
   (-17.93) (-25.42) (-12.38) (-17.79) 
Semi-detached house  -27.84*** -36.67*** -0.23*** -0.30*** 
   (-15.26) (-20.11) (-10.70) (-14.49) 
Other building type  -12.56*** -11.84*** -0.06*** -0.05** 
   (-7.01) (-6.63) (-2.84) (-2.52) 
Sauna   1.73** -0.37 0.88*** 0.07*** 
   (2.29) (-0.05) (9.85) (7.43) 
Balcony   -10.25*** -12.04*** -0.05*** -0.08*** 
   (-15.02) (-17.64) (-6.39) (-9.74) 
Elevator   -5.74*** -5.75*** -0.07*** -0.08*** 
   (-7.75) (-7.80) (-8.51) (-9.06) 
Constant   132.39*** -378.00*** 3.71*** -1.02*** 
   (44.28) (-39.05) (104.81) (-8.94) 
Year of listing   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Decade of construction  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Zip code   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Number of Observations  142 316 142 316 142 316 142 316 
R2   0.199 0.210 0.182 0.193 
 
However, studying all cities as a whole may give a wrong picture of the Finnish housing 
market. This is due to large proportion of apartment houses and houses in Helsinki as well as 
price differences between various cities. Also, by grouping observations to otherwise more 
homogeny samples may give valuable information that is not recordable from a diverse 
sample. I continue my study with Table 11 by dividing the sample into cities and asking price 
ranges to see whether the results get more consistent. This procedure is also supported by 
Springer (1996), who divides his sample to different price categories for consistency.  
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The first conclusion from Table 11 is that results vary a lot and have very few statistically 
significant coefficients. This finding is not in line with my assumptions of less variation with 
more focused samples. One possible reason for this, again, is the reduced sample size. On the 
other hand, especially Tampere and €100k-€200k category show higher model fit than in most 
other tests. This indicates that focused samples enable to explain the local variation better 
than with less focused samples. One interesting finding is that the coefficient for price 
discount follows my initial logic with all samples other than Helsinki and is also significant 
for Kuopio, Tampere and €100k-€200k price category. Area coefficients are also dependent 
on the sample selection, although only positive coefficients are significant. Another 
interesting finding, although mainly insignificant, is that additional room coefficients are all 
negative in the €100k-€200k price range, whereas all are positive with €200k-€400k sample. 
An interpretation of this could be that if a lower priced housing sells cheap, it is either a cheap 
housing in general or the area is very efficiently in use attracting buyers willing to pay for 
needed space only. Other coefficients have same signs, except of listing season that has 
contradictory, but insignificant results.  
I find that when controlling for the year of construction, the coefficient for debt-free housing 
price is negative for all samples except the €200k-€400k and insignificant for all except 
Kuopio. When I test the same samples overlooking the year of construction, I get a positive 
coefficient for all except Kuopio and all of them are significant at least at 5 percent level. To 
capture the effect of construction year to price coefficient I test the matched sample 
controlling for selected ranges of construction year. As I divide the sample according to 
construction year; -1929, 1930-1959, 1960-1989 and 1990-2012 I find only the newest sample 
to have the positive coefficient for the dwelling price.  
To fully understand this relationship I calculate average time to sell €10k of any housing in 
the matched sample and plot them to Figure 13. This figure indicates that the relationship of 
TOM adjusted with dwelling price to construction year varies a lot according to the latter. 
Therefore I conclude that the sign of the dwelling price coefficient is fully dependent on the 
sample selection. However, as the trend line indicates, for the whole sample the relationship is 
rising Thus I conclude the newer the building the longer it takes to sell a dwelling of the same 
price. The peak in the figure with years 2011 and 2012 has two reasons I can think of. Firstly, 
Figure 5 suggests that there was a slight peak in new construction from 2009 to 2012. 
Similarly, marketing times remained constant as seen from Figure 11 and excess supply 
occurred. Also, new housing is generally more expensive than older housing and with 
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speculation of the economy, this probably lead people to make less risky transactions with 
lower debt requests and such. Especially in Helsinki, many of the newer building are built in 
expensive areas. This feature could support the peak in Figure 13 also. Rakennuslehti 
(11.10.2012), a Finnish construction magazine, states that building of extreme high priced 
buildings has declined and the supply returned to normal level
8
. Interesting information is that 
the share of new build housing of all transaction is currently at highest in ten years. However, 
I also test the same figure excluding years 2010-2012 and the trend line remains clearly 
upwards. 
Figure 13 Relationship of TOM, dwelling price and construction year 
In this figure I plot the price adjusted TOM for each construction year. The value on the Y-axis represents how 
many days it takes to sell €10k worth of any housing. For example a dwelling costing €100k that was built in 
1988, took 20 days to sell on average during the matched sample period. Straight line in the graph plots the 
linear trend. 
 
  
                                                 
8
 http://www.rakennuslehti.fi/uutiset/lehtiarkisto/29615.html 
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Table 11 Determinants of TOM with selected city markets 
This table presents regression results on determinants of TOM using the Hedonic regression for the subsamples 
formed from the matched sample. Figures in parentheses below the coefficients are the t-statistics and ***, **, * 
denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
  Helsinki Kuopio Tampere €100k-€200k €200k-€400k 
 
Variable  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient 
 
 
Ln(debt-free transaction price) 2.88 -68.78*** -45.48** -25.54* 14.20 
  (0.25) (-2.77) (-2.47) -1.92 (0.48) 
Asking price-transaction p. (%) 0.36*** -0.45* -0.37* -0.11 -0.04 
  (2.72) (-1.76) (-1.87) (-1.00) (-0.42) 
Area  -0.06 2.56*** 0.90** 1.36*** 0.11 
  (-0.33) (3.73) (2.40) (5.59) (0.48) 
(Condition good) 
Condition satisfactory -1.84 -3.93 2.53 -0.06 -7.25 
  (-0.47) (-0.44) (0.39) (-0.05) (-0.65) 
Condition bad  -14.90** -23.89 -35.13 -9.70 -18.90 
  (-1.96) (-0.67) (-1.58) (-1.12) (-1.03) 
(Single room) 
2 Rooms  15.76*** 10.34 17.54* -2.38 19.71 
  (2.92) (0.68) (1.94) (-0.46) (1.16) 
3 Rooms  23.46*** 5.62 16.70 -17.53 28.68 
  (3.00) (0.25) (1.18) (-1.43) (1.42) 
4 Rooms  37.78*** -17.02 40.89* -17.34 48.86** 
  (3.32) (-0.60) (1.95) (1.43) (2.03) 
4+ Rooms  30.60* -62.87 -7.77 -31.80 42.30 
  (1.77) (-1.36) (-0.21) (-1.28) (1.37) 
(Apartment house) 
Row house  -15.76* -22.89* -7.84 -11.93* -25.69* 
  (-1.91) (-1.81) (-0.76) (-1.78) (-1.78) 
Other building type -22.54** -1.21 -10.50 -13.20 -20.03 
  (-2.21) (-0.04) (-0.71) (-1.23) (-1.29) 
Sauna  14.55* 12.16 7.65 4.35 10.03 
  (1.91) (1.22) (0.85) (0.91) (0.97) 
Balcony  -7.08* -23.18*** -0.45 -6.88** -5.75 
  (-1.85) (-2.97) (-0.07) (-2.04) (-0.64) 
Elevator  -8.55** -5.91 -7.19 -2.70 -27.16*** 
  (-2.26) (-0.66) (-1.20) (0.66) (-3.14) 
(Listing in winter) 
Listing in spring  4.41 5.92 -2.18 -5.52 3.90 
  (0.86) (0.54) (-0.28) (-1.29) (0.37) 
Listing in summer 4.48 -1.04 4.60 4.66 -1.32 
  (0.88) (-0.10) (0.59) (1.08) (-0.13) 
Listing in fall  -2.42 7.93 -17.19** -4.04 -11.38 
  (-0.50) (0.73) (-2.20) (-0.97) (-1.13) 
Constant  139.64 775.49*** 651.11*** 385.26** 26.60 
  (1.02) (2.81) (2.97) (2.43) (0.07) 
Decade of construction Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Zip code  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Number of Observations 1 926 385 790 2 265 932 
R2  0.225 0.254 0.539 0.402 0.286 
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6.2 SUBMARKETS 
A logical way to continue the analysis of the Finnish housing market is to study split city 
markets into smaller submarkets. Not only, because above I show that there is need for closer 
scope in analysis, but also to see if there is variation even within cities. I also study 
submarkets during different economic states to see whether they have impact on the TOM 
estimates and if different submarkets react differently to economic changes. I use kernel-
smoothened hazard estimates that are basically histograms of hazard estimates smoothened 
for easier comparison. The higher the hazard rate, the higher the probability of sale at n days 
after entering the market.  
As this analysis is descriptive in nature, I use the unique data set. A significant reasoning to 
choose unique observations is also the larger amount of estimates for each submarket. For the 
following figures I have capped the days of TOM into one year. This is because a longer tail 
has no valuable information and this way the first year of TOM is better visible. In Figure 14 I 
plot the unique sample for the whole study period by city market to see variation between 
them. As we observe, dwellings in Helsinki have higher probability for sale during the first 
weeks than others. This finding is in line with the results of previous regression tables. 
Lowest hazard rates in the beginning are found with Jyväskylä dwellings. As this is a density 
function, I observe a higher probability of sale after 100 days in the market for Jyväskylä 
dwellings whereas Helsinki is at the bottom to offset the initial difference. This is due to 
amount of sold houses in Helsinki before this time point in relation to Jyväskylä.  
In Figure 15 and Figure 16 we see how these submarkets I form behave during three different 
years. There are two interesting things I study with these figures. Firstly, I compare submarket 
curves to each other: which ones seem to suggest a shorter TOM than the others. In addition 
I’m interested to see whether submarket liquidity is constant over time or if some submarkets 
react to environmental changes more heavily than others. Secondly, I look at the shape of the 
curves, the highest hazard rate the estimation yields and other hazard rate values for example 
at 100 days. The higher the curves peak, the steeper they decline after the initial peak. This 
suggests a shorter average TOM for that period. Following the same logic, if the initial peak is 
mild, the right-hand side tail is fatter and the average TOM increases.  
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Figure 14 Kernel-smoothed hazard estimates for whole city markets 
This figure plots the hazard estimates of retrieved advertisements for each day a dwelling is on the market for the 
whole sample period 2004-2012. Here I have combined submarkets of each city to see if different city markets 
act differently. Bandwidth is set at 20.  
 
With a closer analysis of Helsinki and Tampere submarkets I find interesting results. In 
Helsinki, I would have expected more variation with different submarkets, but still the curves 
contain interesting information. From the shape of the curves I see that in 2008 the average 
TOM for each submarket was longer than in the other years. This was a time of economic 
downturn, which probably caused this effect. In 2005, northern Helsinki dwellings had the 
shortest average TOM and western Helsinki performed the slowest, based on the curves. In 
2008, inner Helsinki dwellings sold the quickest with eastern Helsinki being the slowest. By 
2011 the situation returned to same as for 2005. An interesting finding is that the curves for 
western Helsinki have remained fairly constant over time maybe indicating less variation with 
time or economic state in general on this market. Inner Helsinki dwellings seem to work 
similarly, but eastern Helsinki suffered in 2008 situation to return to 2005 level in 2011.   
Tampere submarkets seem to function more differently from each other than in Helsinki. In 
2005, the western submarket is the only one standing out from the others with longer selling 
times. Other than that, submarkets work fairly similar in relation to each other’s over time. 
With Tampere in 2008 I get the most differences between the submarkets in this analysis. 
Compared to Helsinki, I conclude this is due to 1) a higher correlation with the economic state 
or 2) the smaller sample size.  
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To sum up, this test is not highly informative with these submarkets compared to city markets. 
Perhaps the city markets are that integrated that no clear boundaries exist. With a closer 
division of areas, say to zip code level, the results could have higher variation. Simply, my 
results suggest the TOM is fairly little affected by my division of submarkets compared to 
corresponding city markets. For the curve shifts I can think of multiple reasons. By comparing 
the curves to macro-economic data I find, for example, that the unemployment rate follows 
nicely the shape of the curves. In 2005 the unemployment rate was above 9 percent, whereas 
in 2008 at about 6 percent and 7 percent in 2011.Looking at the net immigration and natural 
population increase I find similar results. For Helsinki, the net immigration is nearly 10 times 
higher for years 2008 and 2011 than for 2005.  
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Figure 15 Kernel-smoothed hazard estimates for Helsinki submarkets 
In this figure I plot the hazard estimates of Helsinki submarkets as presented earlier. I use years 2005, 2008 and 
2011 to see possible changes in relation with different time points. Bandwidth is set at 20. 
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Figure 16 Kernel-smoothed hazard estimates for Tampere submarkets 
In this figure I plot the hazard estimates of Helsinki submarkets as presented earlier. I use years 2005, 2008 and 
2011 to see possible changes in relation with different time points. Bandwidth is set at 20. 
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6.3 BEHAVIOR 
In this section I present the results for behavior related studies on TOM. First I go through 
calendar related questions followed by a study of search criteria effect on expected sale time. 
6.3.1 CALENDAR  
With other assets, academics have recorded various behavior related patterns, usually 
concerning asset returns. I test selected anomalies with advertisement entry dates representing 
beginning of sale time, to find differences in expected sale time rather than asset return. The 
purpose is, again, to describe the Finnish housing markets as any results should be fresh and 
interesting to readers. I test the calendar effects with all three samples. As Table 12 suggests, 
most calendar related coefficients are statistically significant. The matched sample 
coefficients are biased to years 2011 and 2012, whereas the two larger samples have a time 
span of at least ten years. Therefore, contradictory signs between the matched sample and 
others are not crucial now, since the matched sample describes the situation for a different 
time span. Main sample and the unique sample have three contradictory signs, from which 
only December if statistically significant for both. Thus the results should describe the Finnish 
market behavior fairly well for the last decade.  
Starting with the weekdays, all samples name Thursday to be the best day to list a dwelling in 
terms of expected sale time, although this is not statistically significant. Monday has been the 
second best day to enter the market with the main sample and the matched sample, whereas 
the unique sample suggests this to be Sunday. The worst performing day in this analysis is 
seemingly Tuesday. The matched sample results suggest that during 2011-2012 the worst 
entrance day would have been Sunday. Despite the small differences between the samples, the 
two larger ones suggest that differences in expected sale time are more than a week with a 
careful selection of the market entry day. When it comes to the most optimal month for listing 
a dwelling, it has been the late summer months or April and May during the last two years. 
Also the year change seems to be a rather good time point for listing. As most of the 
coefficients are significant, I conclude that a seller with no pressure to sell should wait for an 
optimal time to list her dwelling as the results suggest differences in expected sale time to be 
weeks, even a month between various listing months. The optimal time indicates a “hot 
market” suggesting higher interest towards any housing ceteris paribus. However, the 
situation may change on a yearly basis according to other factors than calendar relates as well 
and one must not blindly follow these types of suggestions. Breaking months into three parts I 
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find only a couple days differences, but overall, middle of a month has been a better time to 
list than earlier or later in a month. I use the listing year for the larger samples as a control 
variable only, as the average TOM for different years is publicly available information.  
It is rather hard to reason why a certain day is better for listing than another, especially with a 
commodity that on average takes many weeks to sell. It could be that certain type of sellers 
list on different days, with more or less selling pressure or constraints. With months, I expect 
certain seasons to be more liquid than others. This variation in season liquidity could correlate 
with other asset markets. Perhaps investors liquidate their other assets during the peaks of 
housing market liquidity, credit is easier available or other similar reasons lead to this result. 
With all samples, R
2
 remains at around 3 percent level indicating a poor forecasting power 
with these variables alone.    
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Table 12 Behavior of TOM according to advertisement put date 
In this table I show results on calendar behavior. All independent variables in the model are dummy variables, 
thus I have selected Monday, January and beginning of month as benchmark variables. Figures in parentheses 
below the coefficients are the t-statistics and ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. 
  Matched sample  Unique sample  Main sample 
  
Variable  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient 
 
 
(Monday)      
Tuesday  5.86  7.93***  8.82*** 
  (1.16)  (5.91)  (8.67) 
Wednesday  0.51  3.16**  3.24*** 
  (0.11)  (2.46)  (3.31) 
Thursday  -5.20  -1.73  -1.47 
(-1.16)  (-1.38)  (-1.54) 
Friday  10.84**  3.60***  3.67*** 
  (2.39)  (2.88)  (3.82) 
Saturday  2.33  4.01***  6.19*** 
  (0.43)  (2.74)  (5.54) 
Sunday  24.03**  -1.57  3.46* 
  (2.48)  (-0.68)  (1.96) 
(January)    
February  29.77***  7.70***  8.46*** 
  (3.42)  (4.96)  (7.28) 
March  30.94***  5.73***  4.89*** 
  (4.13)  (3.80)  (4.30) 
April  -20.03***  3.71**  2.72** 
  (-4.82)  (2.43)  (2.36) 
May  -13.42**  9.38***  6.45*** 
  (-2.35)  (6.48)  (5.88) 
June  14.96**  17.99***  15.11*** 
  (2.36)  (11.70)  (12.88) 
July  2.57  -6.82***  -5.60*** 
  (0.40)  (-4.19)  (-4.62) 
August  -3.06  -9.57***  -15.85*** 
  (-0.50)  (-6.27)  (-13.59) 
September  -0.84***  0.68  -2.24** 
  (-0.14)  (0.45)  (-1.96) 
October  1.44  4.84***  1.37 
  (0.23)  (3.19)  (1.19) 
November  -2.00  9.86***  12.58*** 
  (-0.32)  (6.31)  (10.69) 
December  -1.87  5.61***  -3.73*** 
  (-0.27)  (3.08)  (-2.72) 
(Beginning of month)   
Middle of month  2.92  -0.80  -1.94***
  (1.01)  (-1.06)  (-3.37) 
End of month  2.38  1.19  -1.44** 
  (0.79)  (1.54)  (-2.43) 
Constant  49.68***  103.40***  120.82***  
  (7.94)  (50.50)  (77.22) 
Year of listing  No  Yes  Yes 
 
Number of Observations 4 353  142 316  275 304 
R2  0.034  0.031  0.035 
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6.3.2 SEARCH CRITERIA 
I study the matched and unique samples to find differences around selected key search criteria; 
€5 000 below or above €100 000’s in asking price and the same with 2m2 more or less living 
space for flat tens of area. I begin with a hedonic regression and continue by deriving the 
desired coefficient signs for closer analysis. The selected variables and corresponding 
coefficients are listed in Table 13.  
Table 13 Search criteria regression 
In this table I list the results for the search criteria analysis. Figures in parentheses below the coefficients are the 
t-statistics and ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
  Matched Unique  Matched Unique 
   
Variable  Coefficient Coefficient  Coefficient Coefficient 
 
 
Asking price dummy (€) 
95 000-99 999  -3.13 -24.02***  -9.17 -18.44***
  (-0.46 (-13.49)  (-1.40) (-10.38) 
100 000-105 000  4.39 -11.16***  5.76 -6.78**
  (0.36) (-3.73)  (0.50) (-2.29) 
195 000-199 999  22.09** 2.01  26.40*** -1.42
  (2.51) (0.98)  (3.15) (-0.70) 
200 000-205 000  29.08 67.37***  25.85 65.64*** 
  (1.45) (15.02)  (1.37) (14.79) 
295 000-299 999  -12.09 17.65***  0.52 11.48*** 
  (-0.66) (6.19)  (0.03) (4.05) 
300 000-305 000  125.34*** 83.38***  121.03*** 80.99*** 
  (3.11) (11.07)  (3.18) (10.86) 
395 000-399 999  30.71*** 29.85***  29.58*** 23.51*** 
  (5.69) (7.39)  (5.36) (5.86) 
400 000-405 000  -29.58 95.28***  -104.26 92.33*** 
  (-0.37) (7.99)  (-1.21) (7.82) 
Area dummy (m2) 
38-39.9  -13.05 -22.56***  -8.88 -5.81** 
  (-1.15) (-9.49)  (-0.76) (-2.44) 
40-42  -30.86*** -22.41  24.62** -10.05*** 
  (-2.82) (-10.22)  (-2.38) (-4.58) 
58-59.9  -6.81 -4.32**  -8.28 0.02 
  (-0.97) (-2.36)  (-1.23) (0.01) 
60-62  -1.89 -9.86***  -3.78 -6.79*** 
  (-0.23) (-5.06)  (-0.49) (-3.47) 
78-78.9  8.46 5.31**  -3.63 -4.36** 
  (0.91) (2.50)  (-0.41) (-2.02) 
80-82  8.74 2.99  -1.38 -6.60*** 
  (1.03) (1.46)  (-0.17) (-3.18) 
98-99.9  21.36 8.59***  9.30 -2.18 
  (1.30) (2.91)  (0.59) (-0.74) 
100-102  24.60 8.12***  7.96 -2.86 
  (1.37) (2.94)  (0.46) (-1.03) 
Constant  54.58*** 84.44**  66.53*** 53.60*** 
  (39.74 (233.75)  (9.50) (61.66) 
Zip code  No No  Yes Yes 
Number of rooms  No No  Yes Yes 
 
N  4 353 142 316  4 353 142 316 
R2  0.017 0.007  0.188 0.028 
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I put all the dummies in the same model and control it for zip code and number of rooms. As 
Table 13 shows I mainly get significant results for the unique sample whereas the low number 
of observations in the matched sample (see Table 14) results to lower statistical significances 
of coefficients.  
To value my reasoning behind the search criteria I compare the results pairwise. The 
coefficient signs are not that important now, but rather the compared coefficient values. To 
support my idea the coefficients for asking prices below a flat €100 000 should be lower than 
for those just above. This would indicate a shorter TOM. Following the same logic with area, 
the coefficients for just below a flat 10m
2 
should be larger indicating a longer TOM as for 
those just above. This is because flat 10m
2’s could usually be the lower limit of a search 
criterion and appear first in the search results due to lower price. On the other hand as the 
smaller apartments are in general cheaper in absolute terms, one could easier buy such for this 
reason only compared to somewhat larger one in her search limits. Table 14 shows the 
pairwise comparison results as well as amount of observations with the selected variables. 
These results clearly support my reasoning behind the importance of search criteria. The 
matched sample performs fairly similarly to the larger sample with unique observations.   
Table 14 Search criteria results 
In this table we see the results of the search criteria regressions based on my expectations. A plus sign indicates 
the difference between the coefficients follows my logic whereas a minus sign indicates the opposite. Signs in 
parentheses show results for the second regression controlling for zip code and number of rooms.  
  Matched Unique  Matched Unique 
   
Variable  Sign Sign  Observations Observations 
 
 
Asking price around (€) 
100 000  + (+) + (+)  187 6 253
    
200 000  + (-) + (+)  100 4 168 
  
300 000  + (+) + (+)  25 2 021 
 
400 000  - (-) + (+)  259 977 
 
Area around (m2) 
40  + (-) - (+)  104 5 602 
 
60  - (-) + (+)  235 8 244 
 
80  - (-) + (+)  166 6 695 
 
100  - (+) + (+)  44 3 542 
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I continue with these promising results and broaden the test to study all €5000 price ranges as 
dummies within the previous test limit of €95 000 to €405 000. I use the unique sample and 
control the test for zip code, construction year and year of listing. The results are presented 
with Figure 17. My first observation is that three out of four peaks in the figure are flat 
€100 000’s thus included in my suggestions above. These prices stand out as the worst listing 
prices what comes to expected sale time. Although the €100 000 level does not stand out 
particularly, it clearly suggests a longer TOM than the previous or following dummy. 
Following this logic, somewhat surprisingly, I find that other than the €330 000 dummy, 
every category of below flat €10 000’s suggest a shorter TOM than for the dummies 
surrounding with just above flat €10 000’s. This means the seller should always, at least 
within my study limits, determine her list price below a flat €10 000 rather than just above.  I 
find this result very interesting and I conclude that cosmic selection of listing price has a 
significant influence on expected sale time. One driver for this phenomenon could be that 
banks tend to offer mortgages with flat €10 000’s and therefore the buyer may be lead to use 
the full amount, but not above it. 
I also try the same procedure with the area dummies. Logically, the results are not as 
consistent as with the listing price, since presumably search criteria usually is at least 10 
square meters or so. However, with flat ten square meters I find supporting evidence for six 
out of seven observations. A seller cannot, at least easily, change the area of her housing, but I 
find these results interesting when analyzing the buyer side behavior. According to my 
suggestion, if a buyer candidate searches for housing with 40 to 50 square meters of area, the 
smallest dwellings in this category seem favorable due to lower absolute price. I assume that 
when a buyer sets the area limits of her preferences, all dwellings are as good to her in terms 
of area. Thus, a similar priced dwelling with less living area should have other valuable 
features such as condition or locations that attract the buyer.  
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Figure 17 Effect of asking price selection to TOM 
In this figure I plot results of the additional test to search criteria study. Each €5000 price range is represented by a dummy variable, first one being €95 000-€99 999. Tiny lines above and 
below observations represent the 95 percent confidence intervals. In this test I control for zip code, construction year and year of listing. N=142 316. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
I end my thesis by concluding the study with key findings followed by discussion of possible 
future studies. As for the most individuals the transaction of a dwelling is the largest one of 
their lives, it is important to understand determinants of this trade. Other than the price and 
pricing of a dwelling, sale time is one key feature to estimate when pursuing a housing 
transaction. This is also a composer of housing liquidity that traditionally has not received 
very much of attention, neither among the academics nor the media. Media does publish 
average selling time data every now and then, but analysis behind the figure changes is often 
poor. Other than for the academics, my results should be appealing for any individual 
considering a housing transaction or interested in housing markets in general. For housing 
investors the results may be even more interesting, because their investor sentiment is likely 
to be lower, thus analyzing possible targets with more rational.  
As discussed in the section 3.1, housing markets and housing as a commodity itself differs 
substantially from many other assets. As I earlier proposed, most people seem to take the 
market liquidity for granted without an analysis of why. Selling one’s own home involves 
feelings such as devotion and sadness or happiness. Based on feelings the sellers may act 
greedy, busy or loss averse. Buyers can act irrational as well. When a buyer has found the 
ideal dwelling with desired attributes, she might pay excess price to get the asset quickly or 
generally to ensure the deal. All these behavioral aspects are assumingly stronger than with 
other assets and tend to lower housing liquidity as judgments are not based on asset value 
only.   
I seek to reduce the information asymmetries surrounding the liquidity of housing and explain 
the variation in it by decomposing days on the market to various correlations with housing 
features and more. To my knowledge, I’m the first one to study the determinants of TOM in 
Finland. Globally, there is increasing interest towards real estate studying, and the Finnish 
housing market has been the focus of many novel studies as well. However, sale time or any 
modifications of it does not appear in a single paper I find. Hence, my aim is also to make this 
study diverse to serve basis for future studies. 
The research questions I address with this paper are: How does marketing time of a dwelling 
depend on housing features, location and local macro-economic factors? Do submarkets exist 
and how they affect the marketing time in various Finnish housing markets? Are there 
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behavioral patterns decreasing or fluctuating liquidity on the Finnish housing market? I use a 
data set collected from three suppliers totaling to some 400 000 housing selling 
advertisements. Post merging the data sets and removing observations with insufficient data I 
end up with 275 304 advertisement. I also form two subsamples: one with unique 
observations based on available data and another by merging the advertisements with actual 
transaction data for years 2011-2012.  
The results show that based on housing and location features and the listing date, sellers may 
forecast expected selling time for their dwelling. Although this forecast does not presumably 
represent the absolute truth, it suggests what the selling time for a certain dwelling could be. 
The most value added from the first research question analysis, determinants of TOM in 
section 6.1, is definitely having a contribution to TOM for many housing and location features 
as well as macro-economic figures. These contributions are also measured in days for easy 
interpretation. In addition, most of the coefficients are statistically significant. Most of 
housing features yield expected results, but I find certain coefficients constantly surprising. 
As discussed in the results section, interpretations of these results are often multifaceted. For 
instance with price discount, you may think a reduction in price accelerates the trade, but on 
the other hand the seller may have tried to sell her dwelling for a long time before the price 
adjustment. Additionally, a discount may signal that the dwelling has not been able to attract 
other buyers either. In general, regressions on determinants of expected sale time yield 10-25 
percent R
2 
values. This means that 10-25 percent of variation with TOM is explained by the 
independent variables I test for. This comes as no surprise, as the housing markets and 
dwellings are heterogenic as earlier discussed. As a conclusion, it is easy to say that TOM is 
not fully predictable by any outstanding data, but coefficients still describe the Finnish 
housing market and a single housing sale time expectations fairly well. 
Second research question deals with submarkets’ effect to TOM. I divide Helsinki and 
Tampere markets into smaller submarkets based on official city practices and Statistics 
Finland categories. I study how TOM varies with different submarkets to each other and how 
these relations change over time. The results are two sided: I don’t find highly significant 
variations between submarkets, but differences with the two cities and over time are visible 
from section 6.2. Pryce and Gibb (2006), who study the same method with Scottish data, find 
very interesting results in their study. Interpretation of consistency with my findings can be 
that the markets I study are more efficient or homogenous as the ones they study. 
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My final analyses, in section 6.3, deal with behavioral aspects on Finnish housing market. I 
determine correlations with TOM and listing date: weekday, month, time of month while 
controlling for year of listing. Results suggest that even with a careful selection of the listing 
weekday, the seller may expect more than a week of reduced time on market. With months 
the differences are even greater. Based on the analysis, the most favorable listing weekday has 
been Thursday. With months, the seller may expect shorter selling time when listing in late 
summer or around the change of year.  
Lastly I study the effect on buyer’s search criteria on expected sale time. I find that with 
careful price setting, even if only cosmetic, the seller may manipulate expected sale time by 
positioning her dwelling favorable in buyers’ searches. A large portion of houses are currently 
searched via internet. When a buyer sets, say a price limit of her choice, she should find the 
more expensive housing more interesting in the group for larger area or other additional 
features. By capping the price, the dwellings just above this limit do not show up in the search 
and buyer might not even realize they exist. In other words, these may seem less favorable to 
the buyer or receive less attention. Results of this study are very interesting and follow my 
logic with all but one €5000 category within €95 000-€400 000 asking price range. This 
means with a price set just below a flat €10 000 limit, the seller should expect a shorter selling 
time than with any price just above the limit. I also find evidence of this phenomenon with 
square meters of area. The logic and results are opposite to price setting. For example, a 
dwelling with 40 square meters shows in a search criteria of 40 to 50 square meters. Other 
things equal, this dwelling should be cheaper than larger ones still supporting the buyer’s 
preferences. On the other hand, a smaller and similar priced dwelling should have additional 
value features such as a better condition or location. Thus this dwelling is more attractive and 
sells quicker. In the analysis, I find positive results for six out of seven cases. 
This study provides basis for future research by presenting results to compare with and to 
build new research questions on. With another time frame and new locations the study can 
already be very different from this one. Every added detail on the dwellings might give 
additional and interesting information. Due to the fact that expected selling time is not a 
formula anyone could come up with, I would be interested to learn more of the behavioral 
patterns on the market. Another great topic would be separating housing sold by a broker to 
individually sold and compare the results. Generally, an even more interesting study would 
analyze the effect of dynamic pricing on selling time or compare optimal time on market with 
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selling price as e.g. Anglin and Rutherford (2003). However, regardless of the research 
question of interest, I emphasize the data quality. 
I believe my study on search criteria effect on TOM could be expanded to other commodities 
as well. This might require a commodity of certain price level, but I see no problem applying 
the idea with cars for example. My findings suggest a behavioral pattern that probably not 
only relates to housing business, but could be generalized. Same kind of pricing can be found 
in grocery stores or actually in any consumer stores: large signs with “only €1.99” or similar 
written on them that sound better than a flat €2.00 for example. Other commodities, especially 
cars, could make a good topic for sale time determinants study as well. They are more 
homogenous than housing, but consumer behavior and consumption preferences clearly 
change over time. With more homogenous goods the explanatory power of tests should 
increase as well.   
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APPENDIX 
Table 15 Correlation matrix for the matched sample 
 
 
 
 
 
Matched sample TOM
Apartm
ent 
house
Row 
house
Other 
type
Area
Ln(debt-
free 
asking 
price)
Ln(debt-
free 
trasacti
on 
Sauna Balcony Elevator
Asking 
price 
less  
transact
Bui l t 
1870-
1949
Bui l t 
1950-
1989
Bui l t 
1990-
2012
Hels ink
i
Jyvskylä
Tamper
e
Turku Kuopio Oulu
Apartment house -0.014 1
Row house 0.004 -0.865 1
Other type 0.022 -0.443 -0.067 1
Area 0.154 -0.397 0.335 0.191 1
Ln(debt-free asking price) 0.089 -0.190 0.144 0.120 0.583 1
Ln(debt-free trasaction price) 0.073 -0.177 0.130 0.120 0.573 0.960 1
Sauna 0.026 -0.245 0.203 0.124 0.138 0.094 0.071 1
Balcony -0.070 0.176 -0.143 -0.094 0.106 -0.090 -0.087 0.053 1
Elevator -0.076 0.355 -0.307 -0.158 -0.065 0.021 0.017 -0.017 0.297 1
Asking price less  transaction price (%) 0.057 -0.054 0.063 -0.005 0.072 0.193 -0.083 0.089 -0.001 0.018 1
Bui l t 1870-1949 -0.042 0.134 -0.146 -0.005 -0.063 0.294 0.305 -0.085 -0.376 0.045 -0.024 1
Bui l t 1950-1989 -0.151 0.065 -0.022 -0.091 -0.076 -0.416 -0.379 -0.134 0.285 -0.016 -0.131 -0.562 1
Bui l t 1990-2012 0.188 -0.216 0.171 0.124 0.163 0.220 0.180 0.251 0.029 0.008 0.136 -0.201 -0.652 1
Hels inki -0.115 0.133 -0.149 0.003 -0.064 0.504 0.524 -0.079 -0.109 -0.035 -0.025 0.286 -0.093 -0.140 1
Jyvskylä 0.009 -0.077 0.097 -0.020 -0.012 -0.183 -0.189 0.045 0.021 -0.004 0.009 -0.109 0.025 0.065 -0.274 1
Tampere 0.095 -0.030 0.020 0.023 -0.008 -0.128 -0.132 0.035 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.063 -0.053 0.129 -0.420 -0.145 1
Turku 0.020 -0.011 0.015 -0.005 0.095 -0.174 -0.194 -0.023 0.093 0.092 0.052 -0.085 0.108 -0.057 -0.350 -0.121 -0.185 1
Kuopio -0.002 -0.093 0.126 -0.040 0.046 -0.131 -0.121 0.045 0.069 -0.058 -0.042 -0.116 0.075 0.005 -0.278 -0.096 -0.147 -0.122 1
Oulu 0.048 -0.011 -0.006 0.032 -0.030 -0.212 -0.222 0.032 -0.015 0.011 0.015 -0.100 0.005 0.077 -0.241 -0.083 -0.127 -0.106 -0.084 1
